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This research investigates the potential contribution of the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze to design research. Through a comprehensive review of the literature an 
understanding of the themes of immanence and anti-essentialism in naturalism and 
environmental ethics was generated. Using interpretations of Deleuze’s philosophy with 
the sciences of complexity, I investigate the themes identified through the extension of 
the notion of self-organising material systems to the socio-technical realm of design 
research. Through the analysis of architecture and design discourses in the 1990’s an 
immanent field of design research is presented. The implications are drawn out through 
the investigation of a general ethico-aesthetic theory of design research through the 
comparison of problematic and axiomatic epistemology. The research concludes by 
presenting a better understanding of the relationship of issues of the environment and 
design as well as providing a conceptual framework that can enable productive dialogue 
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This part introduces the research presented in this thesis. It explains the research 
focus and introduces research themes that the study aims to address, with the 
conclusions outlined. An overview of the thesis structure is also provided. 
 
The research presented in this thesis sets out to investigate the potential contribution 
of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze to design. Through a comprehensive review of the 
literature an understanding of the themes of immanence and anti-essentialism in 
naturalism and environmental ethics was generated. Using interpretations of Deleuze’s 
philosophy with the sciences of complexity, I investigate the themes identified in the 
literature through the analysis of architecture and design discourses in the 1990’s. An 
epistemological shift from a discrete to a continuous model of complexity is identified 
within the transition from mechanical representation to diagrammatic practice in folded 
architecture, and from solving clearly defined problems to conceiving scenarios in 
ecologically sustainable design. Following Deleuze, this transition is conceptualised as 
a shift from the axiomatic approach of royal science to the problematic approach of 
minor science and implies an evolution between two different models of the relationship 
linking matter and form. The hylomorphic model of royal science in which matter is 
presupposed as a homogenous and inert mass obedient to forms imposed from the 
outside is contrasted with the artisanal model of minor science which can negotiate 
matter in non-linear, intensive and complex conditions. This shift in design processes 
implies an intimate relationship between epistemology and ontology, where the 
problems posed by humans become isomorphic with the dynamic process of material 
systems, which enables us to understand the relationship between design and issues of 
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the environment in a different way. Deleuze’s philosophy is seen to provide a 
theoretical framework which can enable conceptual exchange between architecture and 
design discourses and indicate potential directions for future interdisciplinary research.  
 
The report is intended as a resource for students and researchers in the field of 
design and is structured in 4 major parts: 
1. Introduction: This part introduces the research presented in this thesis. It 
explains the research focus and introduces research questions that the study aims 
to address, with the conclusions outlined.  
 
2. Literature Review: This part explores the literature surrounding post-
structuralism and the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, in regard to issues of the 
environment and naturalism. This part is concerned with establishing the 
philosophical themes that motivate the research into architecture and design 
discourses undertaken in the next part. 
 
3. Argument: This part addresses the themes of immanence and anti-essentialism 
encountered in Deleuze’s naturalism, through the analysis of the architecture and 
design discourses in the 1990’s. The immanent field of design research 
presented is interpreted through the comparison of problematic and axiomatic 
epistemology. 
 
4. Conclusion: This part draws together the general conclusion for the research 
presented in this thesis, and reflects on the themes that have been investigated 
and addressed. It then considers the limitations of the work and makes 









This part reviews the literature surrounding post-structuralism and the philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze, in regard to issues of the environment and naturalism. It begins by 
introducing then differentiating Deleuze’s philosophy from the deconstruction of 
Jacques Derrida. It illustrates how Derrida’s concern with a textually framed critique is 
aligned toward a trajectory of transcendence in contrast with Deleuze’s connection with 
science and commitment to immanence. The identification of the key theme of 
immanence, in turn aligns Deleuze’s philosophy with that of Michel Foucault. Through 
Foucault’s genealogy of life as an object of discourse, I determine the significant issue 
of essentialism in naturalism and environmental ethics. Finally, this part examines the 
intersection of Deleuze’s geophilosophy with the sciences of complexity, which I 
determine provides a philosophical naturalism consistent with a trajectory of 
immanence and Foucault’s critique of essentialism. The literature review identifies the 
themes of immanence and anti-essentialism that will be addressed in the third part of 
this research project in regard to architecture and design discourses in the 1990’s, in 
order to further the understanding of the potential of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze 




2.1. Philosophies of Difference: Differentiating Deleuze and Derrida 
 
The series of publications in the late 1960s by Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida 
contributed to the emergence of what has become known as post-structuralist 
philosophy. Through their analysis of the concept of difference, both Deleuze and 
Derrida ask what it is to “think” difference in itself, a concept of difference that is 
irreducible to identity, which destabilizes dialectical opposition and opens the way for a 
new critique of philosophy. Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Jacques Derrida (1930-
2004) completed their education in Paris, at the Sorbonne and the Ecole Normal 
Superieur respectively, and developed their philosophies of difference within the same 
post WWII French intellectual climate. To some extent it can be said that they both 
belong to the same generation which came of age in the creative and tumultuous 1960s 
French intellectual scene, which also includes Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Louis 
Althusser (1918-1990), Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998), and Michel Serres (1930- ) 
among others.  
Affinities and Divergences 
Both Deleuze and Derrida made their first important contributions to the French 
scene in the 1960s: Deleuze with Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) which is credited 
with sparking the French revival of Nietzschean studies, and then in 1968 with his 
magnum opus and doctoral dissertation Difference and Repetition and accompanying 
thesis Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Jacques Derrida published three 
significant books in 1967, Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology and Speech and 
Phenomena, which after their translation into English in the 1970s, led deconstruction to 
becoming one of the most important intellectual movements in literary theory and 
throughout much of the humanities and social sciences in the 20th century. Derrida 
(1995/2001) wrote in his 1995 eulogy for Deleuze, I’m Going to Have to Wander All 
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Alone, that he felt “near total affinity” between his work and Deleuze’s, at least at the 
level of “theses” while acknowledging the “very obvious distances in what I would call 
– lacking any better term – the ‘gesture’, the ‘strategy’, and ‘manner’: of writing, of 
reading, and speaking perhaps” (p. 192). Even though there are differences in their 
writing styles, there are parallels in the way each negotiated the institutionalised history 
of philosophy by inhabiting canonical tests in order to transform or deform the thought 
in question. In response to their belonging to a generation that in Deleuze’s (1995) 
words “was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy” (p. 5), 
Deleuze (1977), considered his approach “as a kind of buggery, or, what amounts to the 
same thing, an immaculate conception. I imagined myself approaching the author from 
behind and giving him a child that would be his but nonetheless, monstrous” (para. 4). 
In other words, Deleuze extracts arguments and concepts from the history of philosophy 
and then transposes them, still fully functional, in a new and disruptive site. Derrida’s 
own relation to the history of philosophy is of course one of the most remarkable aspects 
of his work. As Patton and Protevi explain, 
Although he began his career by positing the deconstructive intervention into the 
great texts of the Western tradition as aiming at the difference between the 
author’s intention and the performance of the text, he quickly moved to 
pinpointing the location of the deconstructive lever between readings of the ways 
in which a productive difference had always already constituted the longed-for 
presence. (2003, p. 3) 
 
In this insistence in destabilising and undermining the repressive powers within the texts 
of the history of philosophy, we can see one of the clearest affinities between Deleuze 
and Derrida. 
In his eulogy for Deleuze, Derrida (1995/2001) listed among their most notable 
points of agreement “the [thesis] concerning an irreducible difference that is in 
opposition to dialectical opposition, a difference "more profound" than a contradiction 
(Difference and Repetition), a difference in the joyously repeated affirmation ("yes, 
yes"), a taking into account of the simulacrum” (pp. 192-193). Although investigated in 
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different contexts, both Deleuze and Derrida were concerned with the development of a 
non-Hegelian philosophy of difference which affirmed a non-dialectical concept of 
difference that is irreducible to identity, and which served to complicate philosophical 
prejudice in favour of unity, closure and homogeneity over diversity, openness and 
heterogeneity.  
Despite their resonances, the philosophical projects of Deleuze and Derrida do 
follow divergent trajectories, beginning first and foremost with their different 
philosophical allegiances. Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger are important to Derrida in 
ways that they are not to Deleuze. Derrida devoted the first 15 years of his career to the 
study of Husserl and the centrality of Heidegger to his deconstruction of metaphysics is 
evident throughout his writing since then. While it could be overly simplified to say that 
Derrida’s notion of difference is essentially post-phenomenological, and Deleuze’s 
notion of difference is material and forceful, this characterisation does reflect real 
differences in their sources and philosophical orientations. Heidegger’s thought on the 
history of metaphysics is much more important to Derrida than for Deleuze (1995), who 
once said that “I’ve never worried about going beyond metaphysics or the death of 
philosophy, and I never made a big deal out of giving up Totality, unity, the Subject” (p. 
136). While Derrida always takes phenomenology as his point of departure, even as he 
relentlessly shows its limitations, Deleuze never really takes it seriously especially in his 
later collaborative works with the radical activist and psychoanalyst Felix Guattari 
(1930 –1992). As Bonta and Protevi relate, (2004, p. 7) this position does not mean that 
Deleuze would not acknowledge fundamental structures in what he calls State 
philosophy, he merely wants to highlight the arbitrary nature of the Heideggerian and 
Derridean canons. Derrida’s careful meditation on the history of philosophy is also in 
contrast to Deleuze’s “innocent” glee in doing philosophy afresh. 
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Deleuze found the raw materials for his own creation of concepts in a 
philosophical lineage which included Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche and 
Bergson. In all these thinkers he discerned a “secret link” formed by “their critique of 
negativity, their cultivation of joy, their hatred of interiority, the externality of force and 
relations, the denunciation of power” (Deleuze, 1977, para. 4). These figures are largely 
absent in Heidegger, and with the exception of Nietzsche, they are rarely discussed by 
Derrida.  
As well as the stylistic and intellectual differences between Deleuze and Derrida, 
we can also point to the differential reception of their work in the Anglophone world. 
Neither Derrida nor Deleuze first became known through the discipline of philosophy; 
instead both entered the English speaking academic world via other avenues of the 
humanities such as literary studies, art history and theory, film studies and architecture. 
Only secondarily has their work begun to have an impact in philosophy and the social 
sciences. While they both took the same “detour” in their reception in the Anglophone 
philosophical world, the rhythms of translation of their work has been quite different. 
Derrida’s works published in the late 60s, Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, 
Speech and Phenomena, and those in the early 70s, Dissemination and Margins of 
Philosophy (both in 1972) and then Glas (1974), were all translated into English within 
7 and 10 years, and since the 80s the gap shrunk to virtual simultaneity. In contrast, 
while translations of Deleuze’s collaborative works with Guattari were fairly rapid to 
appear, Anti-Oedipus (1972 trans. 1977) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980 trans. 1987), 
however, translations of his major individual works Logic of Sense (1969) and 
Difference and Repetition (1968) took 21 and 26 years respectively, and his early 
historical works on Nietzsche, Spinoza and Bergson all took over 20 years as well. Thus 
it was not until the mid 90s that a reasonably complete corpus of Deleuze’s works was 
available in English, a good 15-20 years after Derrida had become a staple of 
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Anglophone Continental philosophy. The same gap occurs with the secondary 
scholarship, with Derrida’s work peaking in the mid 80s, and with Deleuze only 
becoming seriously studied in the mid-late 90s.  
Because neither wrote about each others work directly (with the exception of a 
few footnotes here and there and Derrida's eulogy) the affinities and divergences 
between Derrida and Deleuze have only begun to be worked out in the secondary 
literature (e.g. Holland, 1999; Paton, 2001; Patton & Protevi, 2003). It is also a fact that 
the generation of philosophers which Deleuze and Derrida are associated, the 
soixanthuitards, are no longer so popular in France and consequently their differences 
are being considered mainly in the Anglophone world and often not in disciplines of 
philosophy. To further investigate the affinities between Derrida and Deleuze we can 
consider their respective concepts of différence and repetition. 
Différance and Repetition 
The aim of Difference and Repetition, arguably Deleuze’s most important 
contribution to post-structuralist philosophy, is to affirm difference in relation to 
identity. Developing arguments from mathematics and science as well as philosophy 
Deleuze (1968/2004a) argues that “The primacy of identity… defines the world of 
representation. But modern thought is born of the failure of representation, of the loss of 
identities, and of the discovery of all the forces beneath the representation of the 
identical” (p. xvii). Deleuze develops arguments extended from Nietzsche and Spinoza 
that identity must be conceived as subordinate to difference and multiplicity, rather than 
the other way round.  
Such a condition can be satisfied only at the price of a general categorical reversal 
according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, 
the one of the multiple, etc. That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but 
as a second principle; … that it revolve around the Different; such would be the 
nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference 
having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a 
concept in general already understood as identical. (1968/2004a, p. 50) 
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According to Holland (1999, p. 150), the implication of this reversal transforms 
the related concept of repetition, for such a reversal introduces difference and 
divergence into what we understand as repetition. Repetition must now be understood as 
involving, not identity or equivalence among terms, but difference and variation. 
Consequently mechanical, or as Deleuze specifies, bare repetition - repetition of the 
same - must be distinguished from authentic and creative repetition, or repetition of the 
different. For Deleuze difference in itself and creative repetition are what is given and 
representation or ideal Forms are merely an effect or illusion. Deleuze (1968/2004a) 
argues that creative repetition “presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, 
wild or untamed differences, a properly differential and original space and time; all of 
which persist along-side the simplifications of limitation and opposition” (p. 164). 
Difference in itself and creative repetition are concepts which insist upon an 
image of thought which includes and affirms rather than excludes and negates. As 
Michel Foucault argues in his review essay on Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition and 
Logic of Sense entitled ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, 
The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction, without 
dialectics, without negation; thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought 
whose instrument is disjunction; thought of the multiple – of the nomadic and 
dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of the 
same. (1970/2002c, p. 358) 
 
Derrida’s thought also seeks to undermine Hegelian dialectical thinking, for 
which the history of philosophy is seen from the viewpoint of Absolute Reason and 
which in turn can trace the evolution of its own triumphant progress to the point where 
its entire past history is ideally understandable in the light of its present knowledge. In 
this sense, according to Derrida, Hegelian dialectics forms a meta-narrative which 
claims to speak the history of truth as well as the truth of history which transcends all 
previous philosophies by showing how their various problems or antimonies are always 
finally resolved through the famous triad: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The key point, 
10 
suggests Derrida, is that Hegel insists that language carries within itself the ability to 
retrieve past meanings and intentions. For Derrida this means that Hegel’s dialectic 
relies on the presence in language of essential truths which allow our access to past 
meanings. Derrida’s project aims to show how this cannot be the case, and that 
language does not possess such a presence of truth.   
Derrida’s critique begins with his understanding of difference. Focussing on 
language, Derrida coined the neologism différance to suggest how meaning is at once 
differential and deferred, such that meaning becomes a product of a restless play within 
language that cannot be fixed or pinned down by definition (Norris, 1987, p. 15). 
Structuralism, which was the dominant linguistic theory at the time, and the focus of 
much of Derrida’s critique, was underpinned by the view that signs don’t have a 
meaning in and of themselves, but by virtue of their occupying a distinctive place within 
the systematic network of contrasts and differences which make up any given language. 
This situation is complicated, according to Derrida (1982/1972, pp. 3-27), by the fact 
that meaning is nowhere actually present in language but that it is always subject to a 
kind of semantic slippage (or deferral) which prevents the sign from ever coinciding 
with itself in a moment of perfect, remainderless grasp. Consequently, the idea behind 
the neologism is that différance should function not as a static concept, not as a word 
whose meaning is finally booked into the present, but as one set of marks in a signifying 
chain which exceeds and disturbs the classical economy of language and representation.  
In Derrida’s view, the meaning of a word is unstable and depends upon a 
repetition which both subverts and serves representation. His famous statement that 
“there is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida, 1967/1976, p. 158) is part of an argument 
that every text contains an infinite number of texts, an effect produced by both the 
reader and the text itself.  Consequently the privilege of the original over the copy is 
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undermined, and that what remains are no longer copies nor originals, but copies of 
copies without example, simulacra or in Derrida’s terms phantasmata.  
For Deleuze, like Derrida, art does not imitate but repeats by creation, and so has 
the nature of simulations not copies. He argues that art affirms difference and 
undermines representation since it forces movement on the viewer with the effect of 
opening up a “plurality of centres, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of 
view, a coexistence of moments” (Deleuze, 1968/2004a, p. 56). This critique of 
representation can be clearly seen in the serial art of Andy Warhol from the same 1960s 
period. His endless reproduction and repetition of media-reflexive images breaks apart 
the bond between model and copy and so opens new space for the simulacrum’s 
proliferation. Any notion of “original” is constantly deferred based on the repetition of 
such works and their eternal return. Warhol’s work renders the standard, stereotyped 
and repeated intensely perceptible. His art, as Deleuze (1968/2004a) defines simulacra, 
is “not simple imitation but the act by which the very idea of a model or a privileged 
position is overturned” (p. 69). 
Repetition when understood not as the reiteration of the same but as a creative and 
dynamic process overcomes the illusion of representation and becomes a point where 
past and future come together; the eternal return which affirms difference rather than the 
monotony inherent in mechanical repetition of the same. The productive use of 
repetition has profound consequence for the privilege historically accorded to 
originality, identity and representation in art, architecture and design. Approaching 
repetition as a creative process enables us to examine the notion of object as no longer 
defined by an essential form, in the face of a world where technology has taken the 
production and proliferation of images and objects to new speeds and intensities.  
Deleuze’s project of thinking difference in itself and Derrida’s deconstruction of 
logocentrism, have each put into question the traditional representational concept of 
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thought. Derrida and Deleuze both propose that representation is an effect that is 
produced by difference and repetition, and instead advocate the affirmation of 
differences, the critique of totalitarianisms, and creative experimentation of 
singularities. Their revision of identity and language has had profound consequences 
across many aspects of contemporary society, challenging the underpinning assumptions 
of traditional philosophy and culture.  
Immanence and Transcendence 
To further examine the affinities and divergences between Derrida and Deleuze 
we can consider their positions in respect to immanence and transcendence. In a recent 
essay, Giorgio Agamben (1999, p. 239) identified two trajectories in French philosophy 
both of which pass through Heidegger. First, a trajectory of transcendence beginning 
with Husserl and Kant and connecting with Levinas and Derrida, and second a trajectory 
that begins with Spinoza and Nietzsche and continuing to Foucault and Deleuze. 
Although Agamben does not develop this typology to the end, it can be a useful map for 
investigating the divergences between Derrida and Deleuze. Immanence and 
transcendence are highly over determined terms in the history of philosophy and the 
development of such a binary opposition may also seem awkward as both Deleuze and 
Derrida often take binary oppositions as the target of their criticisms. Therefore it may 
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Immanence and transcendence are traditionally found in ontology, epistemology 
and subjectivity. Derrida and Deleuze each write about these aspects of philosophy, and 
according to Smith (2003a, p. 47) in each aspect we can see how Derrida aligns himself 
with transcendence and Deleuze with immanence, however it is in terms of their 
respective considerations of ontology that, for our purposes, we can most clearly see 
their philosophical divergence. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned 
with the nature of Being. In an immanent ontology, there is nothing beyond, or above or 
otherwise to being like Plato’s Forms or God in the Christian tradition, which are then 
used to judge or account for being. Deleuze and Derrida, like most contemporary 
continental philosophers are indebted to Heidegger who brought the question of Being 
back into 20th century thought (which is why he is placed in the middle of Agamben’s 
typology). Yet it is also clear the Derrida and Deleuze take Heidegger in different 
directions.  
Deleuze develops an immanent and realist ontology, meaning that while he argues 
that there is nothing transcendent to being, and the set of entities that he is committed to 
assert that actually exist in reality are fully independent of the human mind disregarding 
the difference between the observable and the unobservable and the anthropocentrism 
this implies. This fact clearly distinguishes Deleuze’s philosophy from most other post-
modern philosophies which are basically anti-realist (DeLanda, 2002a, p. 2). Deleuze’s 
commitment to immanence means that the identity of the objects of the world can not be 
guaranteed by the possession of an essence, such as Plato’s Forms or any other 
transcendent entity (someone who believes that God exists independent of our minds 
can also be a realist but this is clearly also transcendental). Deleuze’s commitment to 
immanence and realism means that something else is needed to account for the identity 
of objects and also what preserves that identity through time; briefly, for Deleuze these 
are dynamic productive processes.1 Deleuze accounts for this through a productive 
14 
engagement with what are today called the Sciences of Complexity, one of the most 
innovative and urgent aspects of his philosophy. The ability for Deleuze’s philosophy to 
engage with the material world of matter and energy shows a critical distinction between 
Deleuze and Derrida, and which aligns Deleuze with Foucault’s philosophy of 
corporeality. 
Deleuze is sceptical when it comes to deconstruction’s thematic of signification 
and interpretation. In response to a question about Heidegger and deconstruction posed 
to him at the 1972 Cerisy colloquium on Nietzsche, Deleuze responds: 
If I understand you, you say that there is some suspicion on my part of the 
Heideggerian point of view. I’m delighted. With regard to the method of 
deconstruction of texts, I see well what it is, I admire it greatly, but I don’t see it 
as having anything to do with my own. I never present myself as a commentator 
on texts. A text, for me, is only a little cog in an extra-textual practice. It is not a 
question of commenting on the text by a method of deconstruction, or by any 
other method; it is a question of seeing what use a text is in the extra-textual 
practice that prolongs the text. (Deleuze quoted in Patton & Protevi, 2003, p. 161) 
 
Derrida remains much more faithful to Heidegger, such that his deconstruction 
necessarily operates on the basis of a formal structure of transcendence upon which his 
task of overcoming metaphysics relies. Derrida defines différance transcendentally as 
originary difference that is beyond being. For Derrida, being is something to be 
interrogated in the canonical texts of the history of metaphysics. According to Protevi,  
 
While deconstruction can dismantle the presence-form nexus at the heart of the 
metaphysical representation … it can't offer us an empirical research program [for 
exploring material bodies]. In other words, the powerful and to-be-prized effect of 
deconstruction – the opening out of phenomenological interiority in the form of 
consciousness to a world of 'force and signification' – is only the highlighting of 
the dismantling effects of such a world on pretensions to natural or rational 
identity and stability; deconstruction is unable to articulate the material processes 
of production of forceful bodies … deconstruction is top-down [transcendent]: 
starting with claims of bodies politic to natural and simple identity it shows 
différance or its cousins worrying and shaking those pretensions … while 
Deleuzean historical-libidinal materialism is bottom-up [immanent]: starting with 
a virtual differential  field it investigates the triggers and patterns of the production 
of bodies politic and thus offers avenues for nuanced pragmatic intervention and 
experimental production. (2001, p. 4-5) 
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 Deleuze and Derrida can be seen to belong to the same generation of philosophers 
who made important contributions to post-structuralism, beginning in the late 1960’s, 
with their critiques of the representational image of thought through their respective 
concerns with the development of a non-dialectical concept of difference. However, we 
can differentiate the philosophical projects of Deleuze and Derrida by following their 
relation to trajectories of immanence and transcendence. While Derrida’s deconstructive 
method carefully exposes philosophical prejudices towards presence and identity, its 
textural focus necessarily relies upon a transcendent structure even while persistently 
showing its limitations. In contrast, Deleuze’s commitment to a realist ontology and the 
productive power of material processes, on one hand, distances his philosophy from the 
linguistic concerns of post-modernism and deconstruction, and on the other, enables 
greater interaction with science (while remaining critical of science), aligning his work 
with a trajectory of immanence. While we cannot fault Derrida for not engaging with 
science in a similar manner as Deleuze, in relation to this research, the arguably more 
empirical concerns of industrial design and its relation to issues of the environment, 
suggests that Deleuze’s pragmatic approach is more appropriate.  
As this research is ultimately concerned with the philosophy of Deleuze, the 
divergence of Derrida along a trajectory of transcendence means that conscequently I 
will not specifically examine issues of the environment in deconstruction. In chapter 
2.2., I will follow this trajectory of immanence which, according to Agamben’s 
typology (Table 1), aligns Deleuze’s work more closely with that of Foucault, and 
examine Foucault’s historical analysis of the contextuality of knowledge and the 
genealogy of bio-power – discourses concerned with the management and control of life 
itself.  
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2.2. Discourses of the Environment: Foucault 
 
Contemporary design discourses, like politics and social theory today, are 
powerfully influenced by the concepts and practices of the Green movement and of 
post-structuralist philosophy. Initially however, it would appear that these are 
movements that are fundamentally in opposition. As suggested by Levy (1999, p. 203), 
the Green movement has often staged its critique of contemporary social formations in 
the name of a pure, untouched concept of nature which stands as the goal towards which 
we should move. Post-structuralist philosophy, conversely, has been profoundly anti-
naturalistic, because of naturalism being taken as the equivalent to essentialism. For 
example the following remarks of Michel Foucault,  
Naturalism refers, I believe, to two things. A certain theory, the idea that under 
power with its acts of violence and artifice, we should be able to rediscover the 
things themselves in their primitive vivacity… And also a certain aesthetic and 
moral choice: power is bad, ugly, poor, sterile, monotonous and dead; and what 
power is exercised upon is right, good, and rich. (1988a, pp. 119-120) 
 
This definition of naturalism holds that not only is there is a “dualism of absolute 
essence and incidental appearance, but also that what is essential is intrinsically more 
valuable morally and aesthetically” (Foucault, 1988a, pp. 119-120). For Foucault, the 
claim of any discourse or practice as natural is seen as an ideological move aimed at 
legitimising particular historical and therefore contingent social relations (Levy, 1999, 
p. 203). From the perspective of the Green movement, post-structuralism appears as 
dangerous and anarchic, absorbed in speculative arguments while the forests of the real 
world are being destroyed. This position which holds that post-structuralism is relativist 
or nihilist is supported in green design discourses by Victor Papanek (1995) who argues 
that the “the trivial productions of Post-Modernism and Deconstruction” … “turns us 
against our own past and against nature” such that we have forsaken the “spiritual” in 
design and “abandoned bliss” (p. 11, 51). To the post-structuralists on the other hand, 
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these statements appear hopelessly romantic and backward-looking in its call for us to 
return to some primitive state of harmony with nature (Levy, 1999, p.203). 
 While the discourses of the environmental movement and of post-structuralist 
philosophy appear to be in irreconcilable conflict there remains a certain similarity at 
least at the level of the criticism of humanism. Post-structuralism develops out of a 
critique of humanist thought, thus apparently resonating with the deep ecological push 
for a move beyond anthropocentric positions, however this does not lead to a 
convergence in the solutions they produce (Levy, 1999, p. 204). If post-structuralism 
rejects man as the meaning-giving centre of thought, it is not in order to replace him 
with the biosphere or any other non-human substratum or system. What decentres man 
are the systems of codes which govern a particular culture’s language, techniques, 
values, practices and so forth at a particular time (Levy, 1999, p. 205).  
Michel Foucault (1928-1984) was a philosopher and historian whose work 
reshaped the varied disciplines of history, philosophy, politics, literary theory, social 
science and art. Foucault sought the conditions of possibility of knowledge, the rules 
which governed the putting together of statements, and the ruptures in formations where 
novelty could appear (1969/2002a, pp. 3-15). Foucault’s (1982/2002b) objective has 
been to create “a history of the different modes by which in our culture, human beings 
are made subjects” (p. 326). There has generally been recourse to observe three periods 
in Foucault’s oeuvre, corresponding to truth, power and ethics, however each period can 
be seen as part of an investigation into the production of subjectivity (Negri, 2004, 
Answer 1, para. 3).  
The Archaeology of Epistèmes: The Entry of Life into History 
Things being as they are, nothing has, up to the present, proved that we could 
define a strategy exterior to [the obligation of truth]. It is indeed in this field of 
obligation to truth that we can sometimes avoid in one way or another the effects 
of a domination, linked to structures of truth or to institutions charged with truth. 
To say these things very schematically, we can find many examples: there has 
been an ecological movement – which is furthermore very ancient and is not only 
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a twentieth century phenomenon – which has often been, in one sense, in hostile 
relationship with science or at least with a technology guaranteed in terms of 
truth. But in fact, ecology also spoke a language of truth. It was in the name of 
knowledge concerning nature, the equilibrium of processes of living things, and 
so forth, that one could level the criticism. We escaped then a domination of truth, 
not by playing a game that was a complete stranger to the game of truth, but in 
playing it otherwise.  
Michel Foucault (1988b, p. 15) 
 
The early period of Foucault’s work includes books published in the 1960s which 
were concerned with how scientific discourse and knowledge in general are organised 
and justified. Foucault named his approach for the research into the structure of 
knowledge the archaeology of épistèmes, and follows in the French structuralist 
tradition of history and philosophy of science, represented for example by Gaston 
Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem.2 His method is called archaeological because it 
attempts to excavate the layers of historical texts in order to uncover what constitutes, or 
constituted knowledge within a historically specific period. Foucault understood an 
épistème as a system of possible discourse which comes to dominate an historical era, 
and which he described as 
The total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that 
give rise to epistemological figures, sciences and possible systems… The 
épistème is not a form of knowledge or a type of rationality which crossing the 
boundaries of the most varied of sciences, manifest the sovereign unity of a 
subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, 
for a given period between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of 
discursive regularities. (1969/2002a, p. 211)  
 
According to Foucault (1969/2002a) an épistème is not a “system of postulates 
that governs all the branches of knowledge,” but is rather, “a constantly moving set of 
articulations, shifts and coincidences that are established only to give rise to others” (p. 
211). Foucault’s archaeology builds its analyses by adopting the statements of presumed 
objective reality, the truth-claims of the épistème themselves, as the background of his 
case studies. Foucault (1969/2002a) insists that archaeology does not try to describe the 
"thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or 
revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices 
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obeying certain rules” (p. 155). Foucault’s research during his archaeological period 
was situated on scientific discourses and in how objects of legitimate scientific 
investigation emerge. He was interested in particular in how humans become the object 
of their own scientific enquiries, for instance in his study of madness and creation of 
medical institutions in the European context around the eighteenth century (Foucault, 
1961, 1963).  
In The Order of Things (1966) Foucault takes a more structural or global view of 
the space of the history of knowledge, wherein he identifies around sixteenth century a 
rupture or discontinuity in the historico-epistemological field, between what he calls the 
Classical Age and Modernity. According to Foucault, this discontinuity is implicated in 
the emergence of three fields of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which today we would call linguistics, economics and biology. The Classical Age can 
be called representational because a clear link was considered between words and 
things, such that words directly represented the objects they named. This was the point 
that the French title of The Order of Things – Les Mots et les Choses (‘words and 
things’) – was trying to express. However, with Modernity a gap began to appear 
between reality and language which meant that representation was no longer as credible 
and a new focus on meaning and the significance of linguistic signs developed. 
Similarly, there was a transition from the classical analysis of wealth as static (Adam 
Smith), to an economic analysis based on the dynamic circulation of production and 
consumption (Ricardo and Marx). This rupture was also evident in the displacement of 
medical discourses in which there is a direct correlation between the pathological fact 
which could be perceived in the visual space of the body, with a discursive formation 
which centred on hidden dynamic mechanism of life now called biology – which was 
interpreted through the information gathered by instruments, laboratorial experiments, 
demographic analysis and statistical calculations (Foucault, 1969/2002a, pp. 34-43). For 
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Foucault the emergence of biology as a new scientific discipline signals the entry of life 
into history – what Foucault later calls bio-power – and which in turn has made possible 
the development of what we would today call the discipline of ecology. 
Contextuality of Knowledge 
Foucault’s work focussed on how a particular épistème dictates what constitutes 
genuine knowledge and truth and what does not. In a simplified manner, we can suggest 
that the focus of this argument is that knowledge is relative to the historical context 
from which it emerges, and that there is no positivist external position from which to 
evaluate the legitimacy of a discourse about knowledge. According to Darier (1999a, p. 
12), Foucault’s argument on the contextuality of knowledge has implications for 
discourses of the environment because, for instance the historical contextualisation of 
biology and in turn the environment could lead polluters to claim that if there is no 
objective standard by which to measure pollution and that therefore the environmental 
crisis is relative and so we do not need to change existing practices. However the 
contextuality inherent in Foucault’s discursive approach does not necessarily make 
Foucault a relativist for whom it is impossible to know anything. On the contrary, this 
seemingly groundless-ground is employed to recognize that scientific knowledge retains 
a certain degree of uncertainty and is subject to challenge and change over time. This 
makes Foucault more of a contextualist or an observer of the construction of 
knowledge, than a relativist (Darier, 1999a, p. 10).   
The criticism of Foucault’s archaeology centres on the tension inherent in its 
structural approach in the sense that Foucault claims to reveal deep historico-
epistemological structures of the conditions of knowledge while maintaining the 
contextuality of knowledge, including presumably his own archaeology: a criticism 
which likely finds Foucault’s archaeology as implausible as its empiricist cousins. 
Foucault was also criticised by the predominately Marxist oriented argument that 
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archaeology is too focused on ideal categories of knowledge and so ignores social 
relations and everyday life, to which Foucault responded in his next works through the 
development of a genealogical approach to the analysis of systems of power that 
regulate discursive and non-discursive practices and the docile bodies which they 
discipline and control. 
Genealogy: Bio-Power, Bio-Politics, Eco-Politics 
In the seventies, partly in response to the critique of his archaeological method, 
Foucault began his research into the relationship between knowledges and powers 
through the development of his genealogical approach, a period which includes his main 
books (Foucault, 1969/2002a; 1975/1977; 1976/1998) and numerous articles and 
interviews.3 These works are concerned with the emergence of what Foucault calls 
power-knowledge, a concept intended to indicate how power and knowledge have 
become manifestly reliant upon each other, such that the extension of one is the 
simultaneous extension of the other. Foucault began this period with a genealogy of the 
emergence of disciplinary power in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
new form of power which controlled life at both an individual and population level and 
which was crystallised in what he calls bio-power. 
Foucault (1976/1998, pp. 86-87) argues that the great monarchic and state 
institutions that developed in the Middle Ages, rose up above the entangled and 
conflicting multiplicity of prior feudal powers, by establishing a principle of right or 
law that transcended all the varied former claims; the law to which the sovereign then 
identified his will and which he employed through mechanisms of prohibition and 
punishment. The law was not just something skilfully used by monarchs but also the 
diagram of its mode of materialization, a form of power which was centred on the 
sovereign’s right to “take life or let live” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 136 emphasis in the 
original). This form of sovereign power was not an absolute form according to Foucault, 
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but a discontinuous structure of power which, if it focussed on an individual, aimed to 
dramatise the sovereign’s might through spectacular public displays of punishment 
ending in death. The sovereign “right to life” was a form of deduction or seizure, a 
subtraction mechanism to “appropriate a portion of things, time, bodies, and ultimately 
life itself” (Foucault 1976/1998, p. 136). 
Foucault claimed that since the classical age there has been a profound 
transformation of the mechanism of power in the West. The sovereign form of 
deductive power has 
tended to no longer be the major form of power but one element among others, 
working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organise the forces 
under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering 
them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or 
destroying them. (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 136)  
 
This transformation is consistent with what Foucault calls a change from a 
sovereign society to a disciplinary society. Foucault insists that in disciplinary societies, 
whilst external wars are bloodier than ever, and regimes visit holocausts upon their own 
populations, these wars are not to be considered as waged in the name of the sovereign, 
but in the name of the existence of everyone,  
Entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of the wholesale slaughter in the 
name of life necessity … It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the 
race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so 
many men to be killed. (1976/1998, p. 137).  
 
Power, Foucault argues, is now situated and exercised at the level of life. 
Foucault (1976/1998, p. 93) argues that in a disciplinary society, power does not 
exist in a single point or emanate from a unique position of sovereignty but that it has 
become a rhizome of force relations (to use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept), which 
constantly create states of power which are always local and unstable. This reveals 
Foucault’s renewed concept of localisation, where we can see that local has two 
different and seemingly contradictory meanings. As Deleuze (1986/1988) describes, for 
Foucault “power is local because it is never global, but it is not local or localised 
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because it is diffuse” (p. 26). In this sense power is everywhere not because it is 
homogenous, but because it passes through innumerable different points. Deleuze 
(1986/1988) explains here that power is neither exterior nor super-structural, but 
characterised by “immanence of field without transcendent unification, continuity of 
line without global centralisation, and contiguity of parts without distinct totalisation” 
(p. 27). Foucault’s concept of a dynamic network of power relations in continual 
variation clearly shows a concern with an immanent concept of difference like Deleuze. 
Foucault (1976/1998) argued that bio-power – power that operates at the level of 
life itself – is a form of control which he insists was an “indispensable element in the 
development of capitalism”, the rise of which “would not have been possible without 
the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment 
of the phenomena of population to economic processes” (p. 141). According to 
Rabinow and Rose (2003, pp. 2-3) Foucault delineates a bi-polar diagram of the 
strategies of power over life. The first pole centres on the body as a machine, an 
anatomo-politics operating through various techniques of discipline and control 
employed in institutions such as armies, schools, families, prisons and factories in order 
to optimize the production, availability and performance of docile bodies and their 
integration into systems of efficient and economic controls. The second pole centres 
around the organisation of power over life, power which was deployed at the level of 
interventions and regulatory controls of the species body, a bio-politics of the 
population. Bio-politics was concerned with the management of the species as the 
corporeal basis of biological processes and the mechanics of life, through the 
development of discourses of demography, and the statistical analysis and 
administration of migration, birth rate, mortality, public health, life-expectancy and so 
forth. At its most general then, the concept of bio-power serves to bring into view a 
field comprised of more or less rationalised attempts to intervene upon the vital 
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characteristics of human existence – human beings, individually and collectively, as 
living creatures who are born, mature, inhabit a body that can be trained and augmented, 
and then sicken and die, and as collectivities or populations composed of such living 
beings. The analytics of population also focussed scientific attention onto discourses 
concerning population-resource questions, the beginning of what we today might call 
issues of the environment and resource management. Foucault’s concept of bio-politics, 
when expanded to include all form of life, for instance in today’s environmental 
discourses, can be understood as fundamental to the development of the concept of eco-
politics as the perceived control and management of the entire planet. 
Sex and Resistance 
The development of political technologies of life in turn identified sex, “the 
means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species”, as a “crucial 
target of a power organised around the management of life rather than the menace of 
death” (Foucault 1976/1998, p. 147). Foucault argued that the importance of sex as a 
political issue meant that far from being repressed in the Victorian discourses of the 
nineteenth century, sex in fact became the subject of a significant increase of various 
juridical and medical statements; forms of knowledge-power which functioned in 
addition to the law within modes of normalisation. 
Foucault’s research into the analytics of sexuality reveals how discursive space is 
not the surface projection of power mechanisms, but that it is within discourse that 
power and knowledge are joined. However, Foucault (1976/1998) insists that we “must 
not imagine a world divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or 
between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of 
discursive elements” (p. 100). Discourse is a series of discontinuous segments whose 
function is neither uniform nor stable. It is a complex assemblage which can be both an 
“instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of 
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resistance and starting point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 100). 
For example, the current gay, lesbian or queer identities are according to Foucault, 
unintended effects of legal and medical discourse creating and disciplining 
homosexuality in late nineteenth century Europe. These strategies of normalisation (like 
the creation of heterosexuality as the norm by contrasting it with the “abnormality” of 
homosexuality) constitute one effect of power, which in many cases is resisted by those 
who are categorised as abnormal (Darier, 1999a, p. 18). As Foucault states 
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, 
jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and the 
subspecies of homosexuality… made possible strong advance of social controls 
into this area of “perversity”; but it also made possible the formation of a 
“reverse” discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand 
that its legitimacy or “naturality” be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, 
using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. (1976/1998, 
p.101) 
 
Because relations of power are not fixed and are constantly interacting, reversals 
can occur which are always micro-political and local, such that power is not an abstract 
category but is experienced by people. Foucault’s integration of legitimate and 
illegitimate discourse in the knowledge apparatus, is not a sense of nullifying the 
potential for oppositional thought, or subsuming it within a dominant space of 
knowledge, but in fact suggests a concept of history as a continual evolution (Bové, 
1988, p. xxvi ). Discourses of power-knowledge are therefore not static forms of 
distribution; they are “matrices of transformations, processes of continual variation” 
(Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 99). 
Environmental Ethics  
Ecologically sustainable design can also be viewed as not only a critique of the 
prevalent, instrumental control of the natural world but as inserting itself precisely into 
the normalising strategy of an eco-politics. Ecologically sustainable design discourses 
cannot be seen as offering a transcendent or privileged external viewpoint, but are 
implicated in a multiplicitous strategy of immanent power relations, and as such can be 
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both repressive and enabling. Ultimately, as Foucault (1988) astutely identifies in what 
seems to be his only reference to ecology, even though the ecological movement has 
often been in “hostile relationship with science or at least with a technology guaranteed 
in terms of truth”, it has also legitimated its criticism in name of truth, in the “name of 
knowledge concerning nature, the equilibrium of processes of living things” such that 
ecology and eco-centrism are humanly constructed categories which are policed by all-
too-human eco-centrists (p. 15). As Darier (1999a) explains, “justifying human actions 
in the name of ‘nature’ poses the unresolved question of whose (human) voice can 
legitimately speak for ‘nature’, and the inherent dangers of such an approach” (p. 24).  
 Most environmental ethical theories today can be seen, in the final instance, as 
moralistic systems of judgement which rest upon a sharp division between nature and 
culture. On the basis of this division, environmental ethics in turn, claims that the 
essential goodness of the “natural world” should be the source of norms for human 
conduct. It is in the presumed “proper” functioning of the “ecosystem” that humans are 
urged to adopt new rules and values. Like Platonic Good, or “objective scientific truth”, 
Nature becomes another source of principles and laws to impose upon human 
behaviour. In addition, as these laws are seen as universal, the norms and solutions 
derived from them also claim to be universal, transcending the cultural and historical.  
Foucault would be sceptical of any brand of environmentalism or sustainable 
design which desires a world free of pollution, in which life is simpler, and social and 
natural harmony are established on essentialist, universal “laws of nature”. For 
Foucault, social change, revolution or environmental activism is a never-ending activity 
in which tactics and “goals” are constantly re-evaluated and adapted to changing 
circumstances within the field of power (Darier, 1999a, p. 20). Foucault calls these 
forms of ethical practice the aesthetics of existence or techniques of the self: 
Those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves 
rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in 
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their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (Foucault, 1992/1984, pp. 10-
11, emphasis in the original) 
 
Consequently Foucault argues for an anti-essentialist ethos opposed to a 
transcendent moralism, which requires an ethics that is immanent, historical and 
emergent such that ethical evaluations must be created within the changing interactions 
of varying relations. Foucault’s “practices of freedom” are not part of a strategy to 
normalise or control but an ethical stance which seeks to invent new forms of life 
through an ecological aesthetics of existence which presents itself as the right to 
difference, variation and metamorphosis (Deleuze, 1986/1988, p. 106). 
Following Foucault we can see that the activation of environmental issues in 
design discourses cannot be sought either externally to power in a transcendent position, 
or “behind” problems of industrial production in an essentialist Nature, but as always 
already folded in a multiplicitous strategy of immanent power relations which can be 
both repressive and enabling. Foucault’s historical analyses have highlighted the 
important arguments for an immanent and anti-essentialist naturalism, the investigation 
of which I undertake in chapter 2.3., through examination of the intersection of 








2.3. Geophilosophy: Deleuze’s Radical Naturalism 
 
In this chapter, rather than presenting a unified interpretation of Deleuze’s 
philosophy, I will follow an interpretation as posited by Manuel DeLanda (1992, 1997, 
2002a), Brian Massumi (1992), and John Protevi (2001). This reading is oriented 
around the intersection of Deleuze’s philosophy with what are today called the 
‘Sciences of Complexity’, a reading which also overcomes the superficial similarity 
between Deleuze’s philosophy and the texts belonging to the ‘post-modern’ tradition.4 
This reading is consequently centred on Deleuze’s ontology, as DeLanda says (2002a p. 
3), on Deleuze’s world rather than on his words.5 However, this reading does 
considerable violence not only to the beauty and experiment style of Deleuze’s writing 
but also because this reading is of course highly selective, as Deleuze wrote at great 
length on other areas of thought for example on aesthetics, with books on the literature 
of Kafka, Proust, the painting of Francis Bacon and also two books on cinema. 
However, it is the explanatory power that DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze contains, 
which I believe makes it appropriate for the context of this chapter, as its primary 
concern is with Deleuze’s understanding of nature and environment. Furthermore, a 
clear understanding of how Deleuze’s world works will enable us to develop a better 
understanding of what a complimentary theory of design for that world would be, the 
task I will undertake in part 3.. However, this tactic should not be understood as a ‘back 
to the real word’ reductionism approach, as there is an explicit political-ethical 
dimension to Deleuze’s ontology (Protevi, 2001, pp. 3-4).6 
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2.3.1. Deleuze’s Philosophy and the Sciences of Complexity 
 
According to DeLanda (1992, p. 129) the last 30 years has seen a Foucaultian 
rupture in scientific research, which is centred on the ability for matter to generate 
patterns that are as “information rich” as those found in organic life. Consequently, 
DeLanda (1992) asserts, “it seems our bodies are inhabited as much by the phenomena 
of ‘non-organic’ life as much as by the familiar phenomenon of organic life” (p.133). 
This implies that not only must matter no longer be seen as inert or chaotic, but capable 
of expressing itself in complex and creative ways. In addition it has been revealed that 
these same expressions occur in diverse physical, chemical, biological, neural, social 
and anthropological material systems and at every scale from planets to atoms 
(DeLanda, 1992, p. 135). These discoveries have been examined by the work of the so 
called sciences of complexity, and it is in regard to these discoveries that according to 
Bonta and Protevi (2004, p. viii) lies the urgency of Deleuze’s philosophy, as it is able 
to make sense of this world of fragmented space, twisted time, and the nonlinear effects 
of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics as posited by complexity science.  
This productive interaction with contemporary science also highlights the 
fundamental differences between Deleuze and the textural concerns of the post-
phenomenology of Derridean deconstruction (with its certain Heideggerian allergy to 
science), and in particular to most forms of post-modernism. For Bonta and Protevi 
(2004, p. 7), Deleuze also helps us get out from the conceptual gridlock of 
linguisticality of 1980’s post-modernism or most interpretations of deconstruction, with 
their reduction of structure to text and signification.7 
This frustration with the impasses of post-modernism is echoed by Massumi 
(2000, unpaged), for whom the Humanities have been stuck in a Euclidian space 
obsessed with binaries such as inside and outside (also present in the architectural 
discourses with Peter Eisenman’s concern with what he calls the “decentring” of the 
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inside or metaphysics of architecture). For Massumi (2000, unpaged) the attraction of 
science and Deleuze’s productive engagement with science, lies in the many models 
from physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics that do not start with inside/outside, 
but rather with concepts such as open systems and models of continuity, which allows 
us to think differently and tackle problems in a new way. However there are issues 
involved with using scientific models in philosophical or cultural discourses, the 
legitimacy of which was the subject of the so called “Science wars” of the 1990s. 8 
Massumi (2000, unpaged) posits his “poaching” of science as a translation or a 
transposition, rather than trying to make cultural theory scientific or a form of applied 
science (as he states, if it was already scientific there would be no point in having 
cultural theory in the first place). Massumi posits a more experimental approach which 
tries to invent the equivalent in a different field and “let it loose” in order to open up 
new potentials, and to think differently. This is exactly what he has been criticised for 
doing in the so called Science wars of the 1990s by the “territorial manoeuvre” of Sokal 
and others, scientists who “appoint themselves as the policeman of the boundaries of 
science” (Massumi, 2000, unpaged). Massumi argues that instead an interdisciplinary 
approach is needed. 
For DeLanda (DeLanda, Protevi and Thanem, 2005, p. 2) the urgency of 
Deleuze’s philosophy lies in that he has rescued realism as a philosophical position. 
DeLanda (2002a, p. 2) presents his work as a reconstruction of Deleuze’s ontology, the 
domain of philosophy which is concerned with the set of entities a philosopher is 
committed to assert actually exist, or the types of entities which according to that 
philosophy populate reality. The theoretical resources that DeLanda uses in his 
reconstruction come from mathematics (group theory, differential geometry) as well as 
the hard sciences of physics, chemistry, biology (far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, 
autocatalysis, embriogenesis). However this could be criticised as a vicious circle, as 
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how can DeLanda claim to develop a realist ontology, one that is supposed to serve as a 
foundation for scientific knowledge, while presupposing objective scientific knowledge 
in the first place? According to DeLanda (2002b, p. 2) if the point of a realist ontology 
was foundational, then indeed this is a problem. However, DeLanda claims this can be 
avoided if one does not believe in rock solid foundations. In that case you can lift up the 
arguments by their “bootstraps” by assuming a little bit of objective knowledge and 
accounting for the rest. DeLanda gives the example of the software hardware problem in 
computers, where software must be loaded onto hardware, but loading is a software 
function; this is overcome by having a little bit of software hardwired. In addition, 
DeLanda argues that an ontology in which there are no general laws (as in his 
reconstruction) would be radically different from that of standard science, and in this 
version science would not therefore be dependent on science’s own ontology. 
This method also presents the problems of the use of models taken from science. 
DeLanda (2003) claims the appropriation of scientific models into this reconstruction of 
Deleuze’s ontology is not metaphorical:  
The key ideas of complexity theory (the ideas of "attractor" and of "symmetry-
breaking bifurcation") come from real properties of mathematical models. They 
are not just linguistic "concepts." And more importantly, they have turned out to 
be properties of many different models, that is, they are independent of the 
specific mechanisms in which they are actualized. (Pt. II, para. 4) 
 
It is this mechanism-independence according to DeLanda, which makes it 
promising that they will be useful elsewhere (in design for example) since this 
independence may be evidence of a deeper isomorphism underlying very different 
processes that can be established non-discursively. Deleuze's concept of the virtual or 
Body-without-Organs is precisely an attempt to think this underlying reality. 
Realism and Idealism  
Realism is often criticised as naïve, and indeed Deleuze once described his own 
work as “naïve”, 
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[Foucault] may perhaps have meant that I was the most naive philosopher of our 
generation. In all of us you find themes like multiplicity, difference, repetition. 
But I put forward almost raw concepts of these, while others work with more 
mediations. I’ve never worried about going beyond metaphysics . . . I’ve never 
renounced a kind of empiricism. . . . Maybe that’s what Foucault meant: I wasn’t 
better than the others, but more naive, producing a kind of art brut, so to speak, 
not the most profound but the most innocent. (1995, p. 88-89) 
 
The most common form of realism is called naïve realism, which refers to a 
common sense theory of perception that holds the view that the objects we experience 
everyday have the properties that they appear to us to have. For instance, if I have an 
experience of a large apple tree, that is because there is a large apple tree in front of me 
and that apple tree will continue to exist when I am no longer there to perceive it. If the 
apples on the tree appear to be red, that is because they have the property redness. As 
common sense as naïve realism may be, it has serious problems, one of which is the 
problem of the variability of perception. The same object may appear differently to 
different people or to the same person at different times. The apples may appear to be 
red in the daytime, but at dusk they are a shade of grey. Thus, for philosophers like 
Kant, reality may exist independently from the human mind that perceives it, but we can 
never know for sure what that reality is like, so their ontology is restricted to 
phenomena, appearances as they look to humans. For such philosophers reality has no 
meaningful existence independently from human minds and so their ontology consists 
mostly of mental entities, whether these are thought as conceptual categories, 
transcendental objects, as linguistic representations or social conventions. This 
ontological stance is usually referred to as idealism. The important implication of this 
position is that experience becomes intrinsically conceptual and that therefore we can 
never go beyond experience. Social constructivism and post-modernism are called neo-
Kantian because there is the combination of the conceptuality of experience, combined 
with the argument that consciousness is structured as a language resulting in the 
linguisticality of experience. When the linguisticality of experience is combined with 
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Saussure’s arbitrariness of the signifier argument, the conclusion formed is that the 
conceptual categories that articulate experience are themselves arbitrary since they 
depend on the particular language of a particular culture, and therefore each culture 
literally lives in its own “world”. This situation restricts the construction of problems 
within the context of language, thus reducing actions such as torture and other physical 
actions that Foucault analysed in Discipline and Punish (1975), to discursive or 
linguistic effects.   
Second there are empiricist philosophers such as Hume who, though they grant 
objects of everyday experience a mind independent existence, remain sceptical that 
theoretical entities (both unobservable relations such as physical causes as well as 
unobservable entities such as electrons) possess such mind-independence. For Hume the 
linguisticality of experience does not exist. Physical events, sensations and perceptions 
have one logic, social ideas and representations have another, they are both real and 
importantly they interact.  Pragmatists, positivists (the official position of science) and 
instrumentalists of different kinds all subscribe to one or another version of this 
ontological stance.  
Then there are philosophers who grant reality full autonomy from the human 
mind, disregarding the difference between the observable and the unobservable as 
betraying a deep anthropocentrism. In other words, while the previous stances deal only 
with phenomena (things as they appear to the human mind) the latter also includes 
nuomena (things in themselves). Philosophers adopting this stance are said to have a 
realist ontology. Deleuze is such a realist philosopher.  
Realism and Essentialism 
In some realist approaches, such as naïve realism, the world is thought to be 
composed of fully-formed objects whose identity is guaranteed by their possession of an 
essence or a core set of properties that define what these objects are. Deleuze is not a 
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realist about essences. Instead of categories and particular instantiations (a set of 
particular objects belong to a category if they share a common core of essences or 
properties), Deleuze argues for universals and singularities, or wholes and parts, where 
singular individuals can be working components of a larger (singular) spatio-temporal 
individual which emerges from the interactions of the population of smaller individuals, 
and which can have causal powers of its own. For instance, categories such as animal 
species are replaced with larger spatio-temporal individuals, so that a given species is as 
singular, unique and historically contingent as the organisms that belong to it. The 
relation between organisms and species is therefore not one of particular instantiations 
belonging to a category, but one of singular individual organisms as the working 
component parts of (larger) singular individual species which emerges from their 
interactions. This is a more radical position than either, simply ignoring categories and 
sticking to particular instantiations, or declaring all categories to be social constructions. 
Certainly, not all categories identify a larger individual in the world, for example 
schizophrenia may actually be a group of several different mental conditions. However, 
it is also wrong to claim that every category is a social construction and therefore to not 
claim that all categories are social constructions is essentialism. Actually the opposite is 
true; replacing essences with social constructions quickly degenerates into social 
essentialism. 
According to DeLanda (2004a, unpaged) the real question is whether it is 
legitimate to have an anthropocentric ontology, that is, to draw the line between the real 
and the non-real by what we humans can directly observe. What makes our scale of 
observation, in space or time, so privileged? Why should we believe in the Hutt River 
but not in oxygen or carbon? Why should we study things in “real time” (that is, at our 
temporal scale) instead of at longer periods (to capture the effect of long durations)? 
Can we really be so time provincial? Should we not consider the nature of reality prior 
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to human existence as well? A broader time scale is required which is not limited to the 
human time scale of observation.  
Getting rid of essences and general categories is difficult, however Deleuze 
achieves this without falling victim to transcendent illusions or universal, eternal 
essences. How he overcomes this forms the originality of his philosophy of nature. 
First, the identity of each singular spatio-temporal individual needs to be accounted for 
by the details of the individuation process that historically generated the entity, which 
Deleuze calls processes of stratification or consolidation, and which I examine in 2.3.2.. 
Second, any regularity in the individuation processes themselves and especially any 
recurrent features in different processes must be accounted for in terms of an immanent 
abstract structure which Deleuze terms Abstract Machines, the nature of which I 
examine in 2.3.3.. 
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2.3.2. Trees and Rhizomes 
 
As we saw in the philosophy of Foucault (chap. 2.2.), post-structuralists very 
infrequently refer to Naturalism, and if they do it is generally in hostile enquiry, because 
of naturalism being taken as the equivalent to essentialism. This definition of naturalism 
holds that not only is there a “dualism of absolute essence and incidental appearance, 
but also that what is essential is intrinsically more valuable morally and aesthetically” 
(Foucault, 1988b, p. 119-120). Deleuze is a significant exception because he provides a 
philosophical naturalism that is consistent with the critiques of essentialism and 
dualism. 
Hayden (1998, p. 104) argues that Deleuze does not shy away from the 
problematic discourses concerning nature and naturalism, and rather than focussing on 
society or nature, as if they are mutually exclusive, on society and nature in reciprocal 
presupposition. This is not a reintroduction of essentialism or dualism: for Deleuze there 
is no unchanging, original nature “behind” society, and neither are society and nature 
opposed and hierarchically divided absolutes. Deleuze’s philosophy of nature 
“highlights the immanent, historical interconnections between coextensive social and 
natural worlds, in such a way that he provides some philosophical resources for 
integrating ethical and political considerations with ecological concerns, while resisting 
the reductive temptation to turn nature into a static metaphysical foundation” (Hayden, 
1998, p. 104). 
Deleuze does not fall victim to the naturalistic fallacy because of his critique of 
essentialism and vitalism. For Deleuze, matter is not chaotic or inert but is capable of 
self-organisation, an aspect which is highlighted by the intersection of his philosophy 
with the sciences of complexity. Throughout the history of philosophy matter has 
generally been considered as inert mass and that therefore the genesis of forms involves 
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an external power beyond matter itself in the form of transcendent eternal essences. This 
concept of the genesis of form is called hylomorphism. However, Deleuze provides a 
theory of the genesis for the individuals of the actual world which accounts for their 
identity through the analysis of their historical processes of production. 
The Stratification of Trees and the Consolidation of Rhizomes 
Starting the distinction in the most general way, we could say that it is between 
stratified systems or systems of stratification on the one hand, and consistent, self-
consistent aggregates on the other… there is a coded system of stratification 
whenever, horizontally, there are linear causalities between elements; and, 
vertically, hierarchies of order between groupings; and holding it all together in 
depth, a succession of framing forms, each of which informs a substance and in 
term serves as a substance for another form. … On the other hand, we may speak 
of aggregates of consistency when instead of regulated successions of form-
substances we are presented with consolidations of very heterogeneous elements, 
orders that have been short-circuited or even reverse causalities, and captures 
between materials and forces of different nature: as if a machinic phylum, a 
destratifying transversality, moved through elements, orders, forms and 
substances, and molar and molecular, freeing a matter and tapping forces. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 335, emphasis in the original) 
 
From the quote above, the Deleuze’s philosophy could appear to have very little 
in common with the empirical discipline of science or the environment and would 
indeed seem more at home in the linguistic or literary theory of post-modernism.9 
However, the intersection of Deleuze’s philosophy and complexity science, in recent 
readings of their work by DeLanda, Massumi, Protevi and others, which although 
controversial, has enabled greater productive interaction between Deleuze’s thought and 
the arguably more empirical concerns of issues of the environment. In fact, we can find 
in Deleuze a rigorous and pragmatic philosophy of environment. 
  In A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), Deleuze describes the two 
general types of structures most often found in the actual world, which he terms trees 
and rhizomes or alternatively strata and consistencies. Strata are stable, hierarchical 
systems of homogenous elements, whereas consistencies are precisely the manifestation 
of heterogeneous elements in itself. The distinction between discrete, hierarchical 
structures and continuous, network structures has come to occupy centre-stage in 
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several different contemporary philosophies, such as in economist and artificial 
intelligence expert Herbert Simon’s (1969/1996, pp. 32-35) distinction between 
bureaucracies and markets – human institutions which emerge alternatively from 
centralised and decentralised control; work which has been particularly influential in 
design research. However Simon’s distinction between command hierarchies and 
decentralized markets may turn out to be a special case of a more general dichotomy. In 
fact, Deleuze claims that the distinction between hierarchies and markets, or strata and 
consistencies is defined not so much by the locus of control, as by the nature of the 
elements that are connected together. Strata are composed of homogenous elements, 
whereas consistencies articulate heterogeneous elements. For example, a military 
hierarchy allocates people into internally homogenous ranks before joining them 
together through a chain of command. Markets, on the other hand, allow for a set of 
heterogeneous needs and offers to become articulated through the price mechanism, 
without reducing their diversity (DeLanda, 1995, para. 1). According to Deleuze, 
homogenous hierarchical structures are formed in a process of stratification, which 
draws matter from the environment and organises it to produce stable structures. 
Stratification: The Double Articulation of Content and Expression 
Stratification operates by double articulation, a twofold process producing stable 
hierarchical structures in all aspects of the world, from the inorganic register, to the 
organic register, and the alloplastic register (social-technical-linguistic), as a way to 
appropriate matter-energy flows from the earth and build a layer that regulates the 
flow.10 
The first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable particle-flows, metastable 
molecular or quasi molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a 
statistical order of connections and successions (forms). The second articulation 
establishes functional, compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the molar 
compounds in which these structures are simultaneously actualized (substances). 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, pp. 40-41) 
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Each layered structure or stratum, displays a relation of content and expression, 
which in turn have their own form and substance (Table 2). Double articulation is a two 
step process: the first articulation is sedimentation which selects homogenous materials 
(substance of content) from a subordinate flow of matter-energy, which is then 
deposited into layers (form of content). The second articulation is folding which 
establishes new connections between elements (form of expression) and creates a stable 
functional structure with emergent properties at another scale (substance of expression). 
In the following text I will detail the production of strata by the process of double 
articulation in the inorganic, organic and alloplastic registers.11  
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The inorganic register, geology, sedimentary rock: Geological strata reveal an 
instance of the double articulation process involved in the production of hierarchical 
structures in the inorganic register. An exposed section of a mountainside can display 
the striking characteristic of stacked layers of rocky material which upon closer 
investigation, reveals  each layer of rock to be composed of additional layers of small 
pebbles that are nearly the same size, shape, and chemical composition. This 
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improbable distribution of homogenous pebbles deposited in uniform layers (since 
pebbles in nature do not come in standard sizes and shapes), suggests that some kind of 
sorting mechanism is involved that takes a multiplicity of pebbles with heterogeneous 
qualities and distributes them into uniform layers, specifically the layered organisation 
of sedimentary rock such as sandstone or limestone. 
 As a part of the greater geological cycle, the principle process for the creation of 
sedimentary rock involves the weathering and erosion of raw materials (stones, pebbles, 
grains) which are then captured by rivers, which select and separate the material by 
grain size and shape through processes called hydraulic sorting. Rivers act as a kind of 
“self-organised hydraulic computer” which, because of the variable nature of its flow 
along its course to the sea (sometimes calm, sometimes turbulent), affect the pebbles it 
 
Figure 1  
 
Sedimentary Strata Displaying Layering of Homogenous 





transports differently (DeLanda, 1999, p. 122, emphasis in the original). The changing 
dynamic of the flowing water sorts the pebbles, with the smaller pebbles reaching the 
ocean sooner than larger ones. Once the pebbles reach the ocean the sorted material 
accumulate into more or less homogenous deposits in a process called sedimentation. 
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The deposits of sediment then undergo a second process whereby the loose collections 
of pebbles are transformed into a stable structure at a larger scale; sedimentary rock. In 
the case of limestone this process involves the cementing of the structure by soluble 
substances such as silica, (or in the case of sandstone, hematite) which penetrate the 
sediment through the pores between pebbles and crystallises, locking the pebbles’ 
temporary spatial relationship into a more or less permanent architectonic structure.12  
At a larger spatio-temporal scale, these rock layers are then folded under tectonic 
pressure of molten rock flowing up from beneath the Earth’s crust to emerge as 
mountains – which are then sculpted by erosion, and transported to the sea, and so on ad 
infinitum. The historical process of double-articulation assembles the pebbles into a 
new structure at a larger spatio-temporal scale, with its own emergent properties. At any 
time we can understand portions of this cycle or flow actively undergoing process of 
self-organisation (flows of hydraulic computers, convection of lava driving plate 
tectonics) and other portions having become stratified into more or less stable or rigid 
structures. 
Organic register, biology, speciation: We can find the morphogenetic operation 
of stratification in the organic register in the phenomenon of speciation, the process 
where by new species are formed. Although gene pools are designed to replicate 
themselves very precisely, random mutations and recombinations create the necessary 
variation for gene pools to evolve and undergo processes of stratification. Roughly 
speaking mutation and recombination plays the role of erosion and weathering in the 
geological cycle, in that they provide the raw materials for natural selection. According 
to Neo-Darwinism for example, species form by the gradual accumulation of genetic 
material, and the adaptive anatomic and behavioural traits that those genetic materials 
yield. These traits are not distributed randomly, but are selected by various pressures, 
including climate, mating preferences, and actions of predators and prey, which have 
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the effect of sorting the fit from the unfit, or the stable from the unstable, and 
assembling the remainder into layers of the food chain. In a real sense, we can 
understand the accumulation of genetic material and behavioural traits as a process of 
sedimentation as in the case of the pebbles, even though the sorting device in this case is 
completely different.  
These loose collections of genes and traits are very ephemeral and can be lost 
under some drastic change in conditions (like an ice age for instance) unless they 
become cemented into a stable structure, like that of the production of sedimentary rock 
from the loose layers of pebble deposits. This second process, according to macro 
evolutionary dynamics, occurs as the result of speciation, that is, when a portion of the 
gene pool becomes reproductively isolated from its parent group and the information 
contained in its gene pool becomes permanently injected into the larger phylogenetic 
lineage to which both groups belong (as in the case of horses and donkeys, when their 
offspring are sterile). Reproductive isolation operates in DeLanda’s (1999, p. 123) 
terms, as a ratchet mechanism which prevents the loss of the accumulated genetic 
material of a population from being eroded away through devolution back to unicellular 
organisms. Through this dual process of selective accumulation and reproductive 
isolation, what was a loosely bonded set of anatomical and behavioural traits is now 
hardened into a more or less permanent structure of a particular species, with its own 
emergent properties.13  
Alloplastic register, social classes: We can also find the process of double 
articulation in what Deleuze calls the Alloplastic register, for instance in the 
stratification of social classes or castes. The production of social strata can occur when 
a given social system presents a variety of differentiated sets of roles or groups with 
different functions, meanings, purposes or resources, to which the population has 
unequal access. The distribution of these roles into ranks and subgroups involves 
43 
specific group dynamics, such as when informal criteria for sorting the society into 
subgroups begin to form once a group who have acquired preferential access to key 
roles then attain the power to further restrict access to those roles. Even though roles 
tend to sediment through these sorting or ranking mechanisms, in most societies, ranks 
do not necessarily become an autonomous dimension of the social organisation. A 
second operation is observed whereby the informal sorting criteria become embedded 
and institutionalised through legal and theological codification into norms, and the elites 
must become the guardians and bearers of the newly institutionalised traditions, that is, 
the legitimatiors of change and innovation.  
The examples of stratification above reveal the process of double articulation 
operating across the inorganic, organic and alloplastic registers, producing stable 
hierarchical structures composed of homogenous elements which emerge from the 
interactions of a population of individuals at a different spatio-temporal scale. The 
second most common type of structure that populates the world is what Deleuze terms 
consistencies, or rhizomes, self-consistent aggregates, war machines and also machinic 
assemblages. These heterogeneous structures are produced through the process of 
consolidation, examples of which can also be found in the inorganic, organic and 
alloplastic registers, which I detail in what follows.   
The Consolidation of Consistencies 
[Consistencies are] an entirely different schema, one favouring rhizomatic, rather 
than aborified… a distribution of an entire population…[where] there is no form 
or correct structure imposed from without or above but rather an articulation from 
within… What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities as 
such. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, pp. 328-329)  
 
Consistencies are systems, according to Bonta and Protevi (2004), that resemble 
“an intensive network or rhizome displaying ‘consistency’ or emergent effects by 
tapping into the self-ordering forces of heterogeneous material to mesh together … a 
system that preserves the heterogeneity of its components even while enabling emergent 
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systemic effects” (p. 54). DeLanda (1999, p. 125) suggests that the type of consistency 
most closely studied in science to date is the autocatalytic loop, a closed chain of 
chemical processes in which a series of mutually stimulating pairs of substances link up 
to form a structure that reproduces as a whole. In other words, within the chemical 
reaction, a component that accumulates due to the catalytic acceleration of one reaction, 
serves as the catalyst for another reaction, which in turn, generates a second product 
which then catalyzes the first reaction. Hence the loop becomes self sustaining, and can 
remain so as long as its environment continues to provide enough raw materials for the 
chemical reactions to proceed.  
The pioneers in the study of autocatalytic loops, biologists Humberto Maturana 
and Fracisco Varela (1973/1980) developed a theory of autopoeisis (meaning "auto 
(self)-creation") to which they attribute two general characteristics. First, they are 
dynamic systems which endogenously (i.e. grows from within) generate their own 
stable states (called attractors or eigenstates); and second, they grow or evolve by drift, 
meaning that because the constraints of the system are internal, the growth of a network 
of autocatalytic loops is in effect unplanned, as the increasing complexity of the system 
does not take place in order for the loop as a whole to meet some external demand (such 
as adapting to a specific situation).  
Autocatalytic loops present a particular instance of Deleuze’s model for a general 
structure generating process for consistencies, which operates across the inorganic, 
organic, and alloplastic registers. According to Deleuze (1980/1987, pp. 328-329), the 
consolidation of consistencies involves a sequence of actions involving three aspects: 
articulations of superpositions – the bringing together of heterogeneous yet 
complimentary elements or functions (the reciprocal nodes in the autocatalytic loop); 
intercalated elements – catalysts or events that intensify the internal interaction; and 
finally the stable behavioural patterns occurring at regular temporal or spatial intervals 
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that interlocked heterogeneities form (the oscillating chemical circuit for instance). 
Though Deleuze’s model for the process of the consolidation of consistencies is less 
developed than his double-articulation model, the concept of a non-homogenising 
articulation of diverse elements is crucially important for his machinic philosophy of 
immanent production. 
Inorganic register, geology, igneous rock: Besides the sedimentary type there 
exists another great class of rocks called igneous rocks (such as granite) which are the 
products of an entirely different morphogenetic process. Granite, unlike sandstone, 
forms directly out of cooling magma, a viscous fluid mixture of diverse molten 
materials. Each of these liquid components has a different threshold of crystallization 
due to its particular properties, such that it solidifies at a different critical point in 
temperature. Therefore as the magma cools the different elements separate and 
crystallize in sequence, forming a nested-set of interlocking heterogeneous crystals, 
where those that solidify earlier serve as containers for those which acquire a crystal 
form later. In this instance the intercalary elements from Deleuze’s description are the 
events that initiate the next process of crystallisation in the sequence; these can be 
reactions between the cooling liquid magma and the walls of an already crystallized 
component, nucleation events within the liquid and even certain defects inside the 
crystals (called dislocations) which promote growth from within. The third aspect of the 
process involves autocatalytic chemical reactions within the cooling magma, which 
generate oscillating stable states, reactions called chemical clocks which alternate at 
perfectly regular intervals. This rhythmic behaviour is not imposed from without but is 
spontaneously generated from within and which can produce spatial patterns, forming 
spiral or concentric circles (e.g. orbicular granitoids) which can be observed in frozen 
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Organic register, biology, ecosystems: While speciation of a gene-pool may be 
considered as the prime example of an organic stratified structure, an ecosystem 
represents a biological realisation of a consistency. An ecosystem links together a large 
number of diverse reproductive communities of different animals, plants and micro-
organisms in a complex assemblage, through the circulation of matter-energy in the 
form of biomass flowing through food-webs. Biomass (stored solar energy in plant and 
in turn animal flesh) circulates through the functional nutritional couplings of particular 
prey/predator and parasite/host relationships. In this situation, intercalary elements are 
the symbiotic relations which help to build functional couplings between heterogeneous 
elements, such as the micro-organisms that line the guts of herbivores which allow them 
to digest cellulose, or the bacteria that allow legumes to fix nitrogen, and the fungi that 
permit many plant roots to get access to phosphorus. Ecosystems also display nested 
sets of endogenous stable states, or rhythmic, periodic patterns of change at different 
timescales or intervals. There are different cycles of nutrients such as the carbon and 
nitrogen cycles, seasonal cycles, the fluctuations of different species’ population 
densities, particular durations of life cycles, birth and death rates, rates of sexual 
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maturation, circadian rhythms, and the characteristic relaxation time a population will 
exhibit in order to return to equilibrium after being subjected to an environmental shock 
such as a harsh winter (called its resilience).  
Alloplastic register, social, pre-capitalist markets: An example of a consistency 
from the alloplastic register is that of markets which operate in the socio-economic 
domain. The more or less fluid structure of markets which arise from the spontaneous 
interaction of many different agents is in contrast with the more rigid hierarchical 
structure of a centralised State institution. DeLanda (1999, p.128) claims that 
mainstream economics fails to capture the fluid state of market dynamics. It assumes 
that markets are governed by a tendency to move towards an optimal equilibrium state 
from the point of view of society as a whole (full employment equilibrium), through the 
of perfect competition among all economic agents (that is, there are no monopolies or 
oligopolies manipulating prices) and that these agents have access to perfect 
information on market conditions and can act upon that information so as to negotiate 
maximum benefit. But when these assumptions are relaxed, the dynamics of markets 
can be seen to more clearly resemble consistencies. DeLanda gives the example of 
common weekly markets, places where people with heterogeneous needs for goods can 
meet those with supplies of them. The matching of complimentary demands, 
interlocking needs and supplies, is performed automatically by the price mechanism 
which besides transmitting information about the relative monetary value of different 
products, also acts as an incentive. Of course, this mechanism can only work 
automatically if prices set themselves in the absence of any guild or other hierarchical 
structure, money can be said to act as the intercalary element, because with pure barter 
complimentary demands must be matched by “chance”, where as when money (or as 
other primitive forms such as salt or shells) is introduced complimentary demands can 
be matched “at a distance” so to speak. Markets also seem to generate endogenously 
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stable states or cyclic pattern, such as the so called Kondratieff cycles in which prices 
and interest rates rise and fall following a fifty-two year long-wave motion.    
Destratification and Restratification 
 
The two processes of morphogenesis described by Deleuze, the double 
articulation of strata and the consolidation of consistencies, produce the two general 
types of structures most often found in the world. However, neither structure occurs in a 
pure form, such that the two structures present two limits or poles of any possible 
structure. As Deleuze writes, 
From this point we may oppose the consistency of assemblages to the 
stratification of milieus. But once again, this opposition is only relative, entirely 
relative. Just as milieus swing between a stratum state and a movement of 
destratification, assemblages swing between a territorial closure that tends to 
restratify them and a reterritorializing movement that on the contrary connects 
them with the Cosmos. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 337)  
 
 More commonly we find complex changing mixtures, hybrids and combinations 
of strata and consistencies in continual morphogenesis, such that strata give rise to 
consistencies, and consistencies give rise to strata. Therefore it is more accurate to 
consider a flow of matter-energy-information encountering processes of destratification 
and restratification at any one time.  
Strata are the result of the congealing of intensive far-from-equilibrium processes 
as they reach equilibrium, a steady state or stability. This stratification is a temporary 
fixing of an underlying flow that enables the emergence of functional structures. Just as 
the Himalayan Mountains, when considered from a geological timescale, represent a 
temporary hardening of the Earth’s crust as it is continually folded by the pressures of 
flowing magma driving the geological cycle, our bodies and minds can also be regarded 
as temporary decelerations of a flux of biomass, genes, and behavioural patterns. 
Languages too can to seen as temporary thickenings in a flow of semantic, phonologic 
and syntactic norms, where standard languages would result from the capture of that 
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flow by institutional interventions, which are in turn constantly being undone by 






2.3.3. The Body-without-Organs 
 
Deleuze presents a neo-materialist geophilosophy within which flows of matter-
energy-information containing an immanent power of self-organisation, undergo 
processes of destratification and restratification which yield the structures we observe in 
the world. There is a sense that the flow of matter-energy-information is therefore the 
primary reality and the structures that form are more like coagulations, decelerations or 
temporary hardenings of that primary flow. The unformed flux of destratified matter-
energy-information is what Deleuze calls the Virtual, Plane of Consistency or the Body 
without Organs (BwO), 
The organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather it is a stratum on the BwO, in 
other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, 
in order to extract labour from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, 
dominant and hierarchized organisations, organized transcendences… the BwO is 
the glacial reality where the alluvions, sedimentation, coagulation, foldings, and 
recoilings that composed an organism – and also signification and a subject – 
occur. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 159)  
 
Throughout A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze goes to great length to reveal the 
movement of matter-energy-information in continual variation and the inorganic, 
organic and alloplastic structures that emerge from that flow. The processes of 
destratification and restratification imply that there is no “ladder” of progress towards 
an ever-increasing state of perfection, but that different societies at different times have 
achieved varying consistencies among their flows, such that a State apparatus is not 
essentially better than a “primitive” society. Consequently a pragmatic ethico-political 
disposition is implied, where we must find the right viscosity for our flows, the exact 
consistency that would allow humanity to self-organise more in tune with our 
environments. According to DeLanda, the 
Recognition that our world is governed not only by nonlinear dynamics, which 
makes detailed prediction and control impossible, but also by nonlinear 
combinatrics, which implies that the number of possible mixtures of meshwork 
[consistencies] and hierarchies [strata], of command and market, of centralisation 
and decentralisation, are immense and that we simply cannot predict what 
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emergent properties of these myriad combinations will be… [This calls] for a 
more experimental attitude toward reality and for an increased awareness of the 
potential for self-ordering inherent in even the humblest forms of matter-energy. 
(1997, p. 273, emphasis in the original) 
 
Deleuze gives an indication of what this experimental pragmatic attitude might entail,  
You don't reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying… 
If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking 
precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a 
black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified—organized, 
signified, subjected— is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen 
is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them 
back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done. Lodge yourself 
on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous 
place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of 
flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out 
continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all 
times. (1980/1987, p. 161) 
 
Deleuze’s concept of the BwO was created in an effort to conceive the genesis of 
form as related exclusively to immanent capabilities of the flows of matter-energy-
information and not to any transcendent factor, whether platonic or divine. While the 
BwO, as a kind of cosmic plasma of matter-energy-information or the limit of the 
process of destratification, appears as unformed from the perspective of an individual 
organism or structure, Deleuze claims that the BwO is in fact pregnant with a set of 
immanent abstract machines, blueprints or diagrams for the processes of structure 
generation, called phase space portraits in the terms of complexity science. However, 
abstract machines or diagrams are not unique to those forms; that is, they do not 
represent (as an essence does) that which defines the identity of those forms (DeLanda, 
1997, p. 263).  
Diagram and Abstract Machine 
The diagram has no “intrinsic” connection with representation and is concerned with 
the morphogenesis of form. According to Deleuze (1980/1987) the diagram “is not 
physical or corporeal, any more than it is semiotic” and so must be distinguished from 
icons, indexes or symbols; the diagram “does not function to represent, even something 
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real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (pp. 141-142). 
In DeLanda’s reconstruction of Deleuze’s ontology he gives examples of the operation 
of the diagram in the genesis of form in the sciences of geology, biology, and 
thermodynamics as well as in sociology and economics. Consequently we can 
understand the operation of the diagram as operating transversely, in that its work is 
concerned as much in the folding of mountain ranges, as in the making of form and 
sensation in the arts, or the philosophical development of ideas.14 
The diagram can be described as a kind of modulator which itself does not produce 
forms but which emits formative or organisational influence; a process that works 
through difference not resemblance in an actualisation that is a differentiation, such that 
the concrete form produced does not resemble its diagram, and such that the same 
diagram can give rise to different forms. For example, in physics different populations 
of interacting entities may be constrained energetically in the same way, to adopt a form 
that minimises free energy.15  
The population of molecules in a thin layer of soap film can be understood to “seek” 
a form that collectively minimises surface tension in the same way that the atomic 
components of salt crystals seek a form that minimises bonding energy. These two 
processes of morphogenesis can be understood as guided by the same diagram, in this 
case the same point of minimal energy. However, the actual forms generated, the 
spherical shape of a soap bubble and the cubic shape of a salt crystal, do not resemble 
the diagram which they actualise nor do their actual forms resemble each other. In this 
case there is no question of an essence of “soap-bubbleness” somehow imposing a 
transcendent geometric form (a sphere) from some kind of Platonic outside onto an inert 
collection of molecules, but the actualisation of a single immanent topological form 




Following DeLanda (2004b, p. 372) one way of understanding how a real yet 
abstract topological form can morphogenetically individuate an actual metric form, 
without recourse to essentialism, can be thought in geometry through the concept of a 
symmetry-breaking transition. Symmetry is a technical term which we can roughly 
define as the degree to which an object lacks detail: the blander or less detailed the 
object, the more symmetry it has. We can make this concept more precise through the 
mathematical notion of groups of transformations, a set of operations (having very 
specific properties) which when applied to a geometrical object change some of its 
properties while leaving others unchanged.  
The importance of groups of transformations is that they can be used to classify 
geometric figures by their invariants. For example, applying the set of operations 
consisting of rotations by 90 degrees (that is, a set containing rotations by 0, 90, 180, 
270 degrees), to a cube would leave it invariant, meaning that an observer who did not 
witness the rotation would be unable to tell that any transformation had taken place. 
However, a cube would not remain invariant under a set containing rotations of 45 
degrees, but a sphere would. In fact a sphere remains visually unchanged under any 
amount of degrees. Mathematically this is expressed by saying that the sphere has more 
symmetry than the cube relative to the rotation transformation. In other words the larger 
the group of transformations leaving the object unchanged, the more symmetry the 
object is said to possess (relative to that transformation).  
 Classifying geometrical objects by their degrees of symmetry represents a 
departure from the axiomatic classification of geometrical figures by their essences. 
While an axiomatic approach would look for a set of properties common to all cubes, or 
to all spheres, groups do not classify these figures on the basis of their static properties 
but in terms of how these figures are affected (or not affected) by active 
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transformations, that is, figures are classified by their response to events that occur to 
them (DeLanda, 2002a, p.18). Additionally, this problematic approach allows dynamic 
relations to be classified in a different way. We can imagine an event in which the circle 
changes into the cube through losing some invariance to some transformations.  
The circle is said to lose symmetry or become less bland, since the original group 
of transformations would be made smaller, a transition that we can now understand as a 
process of progressive differentiation through a symmetry-breaking transition. 
 
Table 3  
 
Symmetry-Breaking Transition: Invariance under Groups of Rotations 
 
 
A symmetry-breaking transition presents a sequence of events in which symmetry 
lost through a process of progressive differentiation, a process in which an originally 
undifferentiated object progressively acquires more and more detail (DeLanda, 2004b, 
p. 372). The significance of such a process was extended by Felix Klein, one of the 
most important nineteenth-century mathematicians, who realised that not only 
geometrical figures but geometries themselves can be classified by their invariants 
under transformations (Table 4). As DeLanda explains, 
Euclidian and Non-Euclidian metric geometries, for example, form spaces whose 
properties remain unaltered by a group containing rotations, translations and 
reflections. In other words, lengths, angles and shapes are invariant under this 
group of transformations. In projective spaces, on the other hand, those properties 
Any 0°, 90°, 180°, 
270° 









More symmetry Less symmetry 
More detail Less detail (bland) 
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do not remain invariant but others do, such as linearity, collinearity and the 
property of being a conic section. Moreover, this group of transformations that 
leave the later invariant is a larger set, including rotations, translations and 
reflections, but also projections… and sections.” (2004b, p. 373) 
 
The group characterising Euclidian geometries (less symmetry, more detail) is a 
subgroup of the one characterising projective geometries (more symmetry, less detail). 
Accordingly, as we move down the classification from Topological to Euclidian 
geometry, we witness a progressive differentiation of space, with new distinct classes of 












Note: Different geometries as subgroups, classified by invariants under 
transformations, with topological and differential geometries included.   
 
 
Although the creators of these classifications saw them in a purely logical 
construction, in which theorems at one level are automatically valid the levels below it, 
according to DeLanda (2004b), Deleuze views them as morphogenetic, “as if metric 
spaces were literally born from non-metric ones through a loss of symmetry” (p. 373). 
Thus we can understand the individuation of the soap bubble and salt crystal as the 
differentiation of an immanent, non-metric topological form into a metric, actual object 
through a process of symmetry-breaking events. Furthermore, the actual form produced 
through this process of individuation is not defined by its resemblance or faithfulness to 
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a transcendent essence, but by its dynamic response to events through the divergent 
actualisation of a real topological form. 
Possible/Real versus Actual/Virtual 
The ability of topological forms (and other abstract machines) to give rise to many 
different physical instantiations through a process of divergent actualisation, presents an 
important theory of innovation, which follows Henri Bergson as a critique the 
mechanical and deterministic view of causality as it was understood at the beginning of 
the 20th century and which is still prevalent today. As DeLanda (1998) relates, “if the 
future is already given in the past [as an essence], if the future is merely that modality of 
time where previously determined possibilities become realised [a process determined 
by resemblance], then true innovation is impossible”, to avoid this mistake we must 
“model the future as open-ended, and the past and the present as pregnant not only with 
possibilities which become real, but with virtualities which become actual” (p. 30, 
emphasis in original). As DeLanda describes,  
The distinction between the possible and the real assumes a set of predefined 
forms (or essences) which acquire physical reality as material forms that resemble 
them. From a morphogenetic point of view, realizing a possibility does not add 
anything to predefined form except reality. The distinction between the virtual and 
the actual on the other hand, does not involve resemblance of any kind [e.g. a 
topological point becomes a geometrical sphere], and far from constituting the 
essential identity of a given structure, the virtual form subverts this identity, since 
structures as different as spheres and cubes emerge from the same topological 
point. (1998, p.30) 
 
The virtual (BwO) can be understood as a continuous multiplicity that is related to 
the actual by a temporal process of individuation that does not operate by resemblance 
and is instead an open-ended evolution of genuine creativity. The BwO can therefore be 
understood as the capacity or potential for change and creativity in a system, and as 
such the BwO must not be understood as a kind of transcendent heaven or essence but 
as real and immanent with the actual world. The virtual is the space of emergence for 
the new.  
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Deleuze provides philosophically for the world in a manner that emphasises the 
immanent capabilities of matter-energy-information to organise itself through an 
immanent power, that is, without recourse to any form of transcendent intervention. 
Accordingly Deleuze’s eco-politics must also correspond to an immanent, and anti-
essentialist ethics.   
Ethology: Deleuze's Naturalism 
One of the most profound constants of Naturalism is to denounce everything that 
is sadness, everything that is the cause of sadness, and everything that needs 
sadness to exercise its power. From Lucretius to Nietzsche, the same end is 
pursued and attained. Naturalism makes of thought and sensibility an affirmation. 
It directs its attack against the prestige of the negative; it deprives the negative of 
all its power; it refuses to the spirit of the negative the right to speak in the name 
of philosophy… The multiple as multiple is the object of affirmation, just as the 
diverse and diverse is the object of joy. (Deleuze, 1969/2004b, p. 315) 
 
 As we have seen, Deleuze presents a notion of the world as matter in continuous 
variation, the limit form of which he calls the Body-without-Organs [BwO]. This 
continuous flux is constantly coagulating, folding, and changing at different rates 
through processes of destratification and restratification which create the different types 
of structures that populate the BwO: here more extensive, homogenous and hierarchical; 
there more intensive, heterogeneous and dynamic. The processes that create a structure 
or body are mechanism independent such that the body they produce “can be anything; 
it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a 
social body, a collectivity” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 629).  Even though the structures or 
bodies that install themselves on the BwO cannot be detached from the flow of matter in 
continual variation that they are always already a part of, Deleuze claims they can be 
distinguished by their rates of change and their capacities to affect other bodies and be 
affected by other bodies, the study of which Deleuze calls ethology.  
 Deleuze (1992) develops this dual definition of a body in relation to Baruch 
Spinoza’s concept of “one Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all individuals, a nature 
that is in itself an individual varying in an infinite number of ways… a common plane 
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of immanence on which all bodies, all minds and all individuals are situated” (p. 625). 
This one Nature is common to all things because it is there that life, each living 
individuality, is composed, not by a transcendent form or essence but by its relations of 
movement or rest and its capacities to affect and be affected (Deleuze, 1992, p. 626). 
Nature is thus seen by Deleuze (1992) as an immanent plane of life which all things 
enter into, both in their own individual compositions, and the complex interconnected 
relations they form between other compositions, such that “it is by speed and slowness 
that one slips in among things, that one connects with something else” (p. 626). Each 
thing, on the immanent plane of Nature, is defined by the arrangements of movement it 
enters into and the connections of the dynamic capacities each thing has to act and to be 
acted upon as they intersect with the capacities of others, forming a continuity “which 
applies equally to the inanimate and the animate, the artificial and the natural” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 254). This does not mean that there is an undivided totality 
transcending particular things or that every thing is connected to every other thing, as 
Deleuze states the “infinity of more or less connected relations… has nothing to do with 
a ground buried deep within things, nor with an end or a project in the mind of God”, 
and that nature “expresses in a single meaning all that differs” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 254). Thus, according to Hayden (1998), while nature provides the basis 
for the continuity of all things, it is also the basis “for recognising the multiplicity of 
nature since it makes possible a rich differentiation of things in terms of the kinds of 
variations, interactions, requirements, circumstances, and capacities applicable to each 
thing and its local habitat” (p. 188). Deleuze’s form of naturalism can therefore be seen 
as endorsing biodiversity as he argues for both the continuity of all things and the 
affirmation of the entire variety of nature’s diversity. A form of biodiversity that is 
“composed of all species of micro-organisms, plants, animals, the milieux or 
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ecosystems they are a part of, and the specific assemblages formed by the relationships 
and processes flowing between these elements” (Hayden, 1998, p. 118). 
 Deleuze’s affirmation of Spinoza’s concept of a single, immanent plane of nature, 
which is constructed  without any transcendent factors, is carried forward into its ethical 
and political implications. As bodies are defined by their speeds and their affects, rather 
than by the possession of an essence, one does not know ahead of time what problems a 
body is able to solve. As Deleuze (1992) states, “you do not know beforehand what 
good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or mind can 
do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination” (p. 627). This 
requires an ethical approach that does not resort to transcendent values or moral laws 
but which involves “a long affair with experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence” 
(Deleuze, 1992, p. 627). As Deleuze (1992) explains, “Spinoza’s ethics has nothing to 
do with morality; he conceives it as an ethology” (p. 627). Ethology refers to both the 
study of animal behaviour, and to the study of the formation and evolution of human 
ethos, a concept which Deleuze uses, according to Hayden (1998), “in order to 
emphasise the nondualistic continuity of human and nonhuman life forms and their 
complex environmental interrelationships, as well as to propose an overlap between the 
physical, biological, and chemical, and the social, ethical and political” (p. 117). 
Deleuze writes, 
Ethology is first of all the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of the 
capacities for affecting and being affected that characterise each thing. For each 
thing these relations and capacities have an amplitude, thresholds (maximum and 
minimum) and variations or transformations that are peculiar to them. And they 
select, in the world or in Nature, that which corresponds to the thing; that is, they 
select what affects or is affected by the thing, what moves or is moved by it. For 
example, given an animal, what is this animal unaffected by in the infinite world? 
What does it react to positively or negatively? What are its nutrients and its 
poisons? What does it ‘take’ into its world? Every point has its counterpoints: the 
plant and the rain, the spider and the fly. So an animal, a thing, is never separable 
from its relations with the world. The interior is only a selected exterior, and the 
exterior, a projected interior. The speed and slowness of metabolisms, 
perceptions, actions and reactions link to together to constitute a particular 
individual in the world. (1992, p. 627-8) 
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 Ethology maps how organisms and environments are mutually unfolded and 
enfolded structures, it presents a form of cartography which Deleuze (1992) likens to 
music composition, such that it “defines the melodic lines or contrapuntal relations that 
constitute a thing” (p. 629; also Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, chap. 11). The 
“symphony of Nature” is a “plane of musical composition”, a rhythm or refrain that 
constitutes the relations between components but which is not contained exclusively in 
any one of them. The refrain is the fold between the contraction of the octopus’s 
muscular pocket and the water it expels as it swims, or the fold between the wasp and 
the orchid. As Bogue (2003) relates, “the stagemaker sings its territorial song, yet its 
musical motif is part of a refrain that includes its perching stick, the leaves it turns, the 
mate it attracts, the songs of its competitors, and the space it controls” (p. 74).  Ethology 
“studies the compositions of the relations or the capacities between different things”, 
and seeks not only to understand what relations affirm a given thing but also what new 
relations can be formed in order to compose assemblages and symbiotic couplings 
which are favourable to all individuals belonging to them: “How can a being take 
another being into its world, while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations 
and world?” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 628). The concerns of the ethologist move from 
assessing existing ecological conditions to the proposal of new ways of thinking, feeling 
and acting, that are beneficial to the flourishing of all life on earth (Hayden, 1998, p. 
119). 
Moralism versus Ethicism 
 Deleuze’s naturalism is ideally suited to issues of the environment in my opinion 
because it is an ecological ethics that refuses to defer to the existence of transcendent 
values. As we have seen in Foucault and as Deleuze frequently reiterates, to find 
transcendent values such as the Good or the True in a static nature is to mistake nature 
as an ultimate moral determinant. Ethics on the other hand, is the compliment to what 
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Deleuze calls immanent modes of existence (Hayden, 1998, p. 120). This distinction 
between moralism and ethicism reaffirms how Deleuze’s naturalism is anti-essentialist, 
and can reveal the trajectory for an active ecological ethics or ethos. 
 Deleuze (1981/1988) is critical of moral theories, such as those articulated by 
Plato or Kant, because morality “always refers to transcendent values” and functions as 
a “system of judgement” (p. 23). Moralism typically starts from a dualism between 
mind and nature, claiming that it is rational thought that gives access to transcendent 
values or principals that make moral conduct possible, while seeking to justify moral 
values within a framework of universal, absolute transcendent criteria that are then 
imposed from without upon the real conditions of existence. The universality of moral 
systems of judgement thus includes what is “proper” or rational within a sphere of 
judgement, while excluding or ignoring that which is different. In other words, the 
Good, the True or the Just, reside outside time and change, and are only accessible 
under the special condition of rational thought which is itself an attribute only of certain 
citizens, therefore moral theories operate by thresholds of exclusion or as a kind of 
boundary patrol that assigns value from a privileged transcendent position of judgement 
(Mackenzie, 2005b, p. 107). 
 Conversely, Deleuze (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991/1994), argues that “thinking takes 
place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (p. 85) and that ethics does not 
transcend reality but is instead given within concrete situations and moments, 
There is not the slightest reason for thinking that modes of existence need 
transcendent values by which they could be compared, selected and judged 
relative to one another. On the contrary, there are only immanent criteria. A 
possibility of life is evaluated through itself in the movements it lays out and the 
intensities it creates on a plane of immanence. (1991/1994, p. 74) 
 
While morality measures types of existence against external, fixed standards, 
ethics is a kind of knowledge which cultivates a fluid understanding of changing affects, 
capabilities, needs or powers that is ongoing and never ending, because evaluation is 
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itself a way of being, in Foucaultian terms a style of life or an aesthetics of existence of 
the one who actively evaluates. For Deleuze (1995) the difference between morality and 
ethics is that “morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones 
that judge actions and intentions in relation to transcendent values,” while “ethics is a 
set of operational rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of 
existing involved” (p. 100). Evaluation therefore changes in the same manner as 
characteristic of the constant variation of natural reality.  
 However, Deleuze’s ethos is confronted with the accusation of relativism in the 
same manner as Foucault. According to Hayden (1998, p. 121) Deleuze’s pluralistic 
naturalism implies the relativism of existing values but only because it affirms the 
contextuality of their historical emergence and genesis. While a principle of ethical 
relativism would hold that there are no criteria by which to determine that any one value 
is preferable to any other, Deleuze insists that there are criteria, but that they are 
immanent, historical and emergent rather then transcendent, essential and static 
(Hayden, 1998, p. 121). Ethics can be seen as the practice of developing an ethos which 
considers ethical evaluations as emerging from constantly varying relations and 
interactions between diverse members of a complex movement of matter-energy-
information in continual variation. An ecological ethos which Deleuze argues involves 
“a long affair with experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 
627), and a willingness to find or create what is most advantageous for even the 
humblest forms of matter.  
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2.3.4. Deleuze’s Schizoanalytical Method  
 
Deleuze’s study of the production of bodies and assemblages can be “referred to 
by various names: rhizomatics, stratoanalysis, schizoanalysis, nomadology, 
micropolitics, pragmatics, the science of multiplicities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 43). In regard to the purpose of this research, such a study can be seen as 
the extension of the notion of self-organising material systems – systems that refuse to 
submit their production to transcendent agents or eternal essences – to the eco-political 
and social-technical realms of design research. This position implies that design 
discourses are emergent structures produced when an intensive flow reaches certain 
thresholds that activate self-ordering patterns inherent in the material interactions of the 
components (Bonta & Protevi, 2004, p. 36).  
In order to claim “ontological emergence”, that is, to claim the emergence of 
patterns in design research as real aspects of the world (consistent with the realist 
commitment to capturing features of the world rather than modelling phenomena), we 
must show the existence of attractors of the same type in many different actualisations 
(the same abstract machines informing structures in different systems), through the 
demonstration of the formation of singularities in the agent-based computer modelling 
of systems. Modelling complex systems involves constructing a visual representation of 
the behaviour of the dynamic systems, called a “state space portrait”.16 If the state space 
portrait establishes the presence of the three basic constituents of the state space of self-
organising systems: attractors, bifurcators and symmetry-breaking events, then we can 
claim the evidence of ontological emergence. While such modelling techniques have 
had success in the sciences, we are still far away from being able to model socio-
technical systems such as those studied in design research.  
Therefore we have to be satisfied with the intuition that socio-technical systems 
are complex systems with emergent structures, without being able to model them. 
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However, according to Bonta and Protevi (2004, p. 33), this does not mean that we 
cannot use Deleuze’s intersection with complexity theory as a “folk ontology”, and look 
for patterns and thresholds in social-technical systems. Rather, we can adopt Deleuze’s 
call for an experimental attitude and try to open up new potentials and opportunities to 
think differently. A task I undertake in the next part through the schizoanalysis of the 
emergence of continuous models of complexity in architecture and design in the 1990’s, 
and the consideration of the implications of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze for design 








This part addresses the themes of immanence and anti-essentialism encountered in 
the literature review, through the analysis of the emergence of continuous models of 
complexity in architecture and design in the 1990’s. The immanent field of design 
research presented is interpreted through the comparison of problematic and axiomatic 
epistemology. 
 
The notion of the environment as a complex system of interacting flows of matter, 
information, relationships and processes as posited by Gilles Deleuze can be mapped in 
the territory of design research through the analysis of Ezio Manzini’s ecology of the 
artificial and Greg Lynn’s concept of folded architecture. These two discourses can be 
considered as emerging through the transition from a discrete to a continuous diagram 
of complexity. In folded architecture, this transition has been characterised by the shift 
from deconstructivist techniques of collage and contradiction developed in the 1980’s to 
a folded logic of continuity and curvature in the 1990’s. A contiguous transition can be 
discerned in design discourses within the change from the external moral code of green 
design to the immanent ethos of ecologically sustainable design.  
Following Deleuze’s schizoanalytical method, the emergence and isomorphism 
of these two discourses can be argued to be informed by the divergent actualisation of 
an abstract machine. In order to examine this argument, I first analyse the continuity 
between folding in architecture and ecologically sustainable design by comparing and 
connecting their main concepts in order to establish their isomorphism (chap. 3.1.). 
Then through the examination of the distinction between the static complexity of 
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discrete multiplicities and dynamic complexity continuous multiplicities, I determine 
the inherently temporal focus of these discourses. 
In chapter 3.2. I investigate how this concern with the temporal nature of 
continuous complexity has prompted the respective development of design techniques 
such as diagramming in folded architecture and scenario building in ecologically 
sustainable design, techniques employed to negotiate the complexity of the 
contemporary environment through engaging time, change, and flexibility. The 
subsequent continuity of scenario building and diagramming, when seen as informed by 
Deleuze critique, I argue enables exchange and dialogue between the two disciplines, 
without unifying the two discourses within a transcendent totality. The implications of 
these analyses for design and issues of the environment are subsequently drawn out in 
chapter 3.3. in relation to trajectories of immanence and transcendence in design 
processes, as developed in Deleuze’s distinction between the axiomatic method of 
Royal science and the problematic method of Minor science.  
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Table 5  
 
Transitions toward a Continuous Diagram of Complexity in  




Folding in Architecture 
In the key architectural text of this period, the 1993 issue of Architectural design 
edited by Greg Lynn entitled Folding in architecture, a number of theorists and 
architects articulated a concept of architectural complexity in the form of a logic of 
curvalinearity. This logic sought to displace the fragmentary collage of opposition and 
contradiction characteristic of the fragmentary forms of deconstructivist architecture, 
through the integration of difference in the calculus of continuous variation inherent in 
curved and flexible forms; the production of which was becoming increasingly 
accessible in conjunction with developments in computer modelling technology. 
According to Lynn (1993/2004), the development of this logic of curvalinearity which 
integrates “differences within a continuous yet heterogeneous system”, is developed in 




















unity that maintains detail as a discrete moment that participates intensively in the 
construction of a new kind of whole” (p. 11, 24). 
Folding implies a smooth relationship between diverse elements that unlike a 
simple hierarchy or modularity, weaves together a multiplicity of macro and micro 
scales whose consistency is neither exterior nor super-structural but which is 
characterised by “immanence of field without transcendent unification, continuity of 
line without global centralisation and contiguity of parts without distinct totalization” 
(Deleuze, 1986/1988, p. 27). According to architectural theorist John Rajchman 
(1993/2004, p. 78) in his essay Out of the Fold from Folding in architecture, Deleuze’s 
concept of the fold offers an original concept of complexity that does not consist in the 
one that is said in many ways, but rather in the fact each thing may always diverge into 
many others, as in the ever forking paths in Borges’ fabled garden; a kind of complexity 
whose fabric can never be completely unfolded or definitely explicated, since to unfold 
or explicate it is only to fold or complicate it anew. Thus the fold is a model of 
complexity that does not consist of fragments or ruins of a lost or absent whole, but in 
the potential for divergence with any given unity. In this manner according to 
Rajchman,  
the concept of complexity is freed from the logic of contradiction or opposition 
and connected instead to a logic of intervals: it becomes a matter of a ‘free’ 
differentiation (not subordinated to fixed analogies or categorical identities) and 
a ‘complex’ repetition (not restricted to the imitation of a pre-given model, 
origin or end). (1993/2004, p. 78) 
 
Following Lynn and Rajchman, the flexible complexity generated by the 
employment of Deleuze concept of the fold, presents a notion of complexity through 
divergence, which in turn reveals a transition from the notion of complexity through 
contradiction characteristic of Deconstructivist architecture. This transition can be 
interpreted as a process of destratification, as the discrete complexity of 
Deconstructivist architecture can be reduced to a collection of parts or aggregate of 
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points, which can be seen as intrinsically divisible. On the other hand, the continuous 
variation of folded architecture presents a concept of complexity that is irreducible, 
because it is always creatively changing. 
Folded architecture has also been interpreted as organic or “biomorphic” and 
characterised as “ecological” (Hays, Ingraham & Kennedy, 1995, p. 9). This transition 
to an ecological concept of complexity has also been articulated in design by a number 
of authors through the concept of the ecology of the artificial (e.g. Buchanan 2000, 
2001; Krippendorf, 1989/1995; Manzini 1992/1995).  
From Green Design to Ecologically Sustainable Design  
Since the 1960’s and 1970’s, ethical concerns in design have become 
increasingly centred on the impact of products as part of the physical and social 
environment rather than focussed on the personal morality of the designer or on social 
conditions of production (Whitely, 1999, pp. 196-200). Borrowed from the 
environmental movement in politics, the term green quickly became the buzz word in 
design culture through the 1980’s with a proliferation of “how to be green” design 
exhibitions and design literature. As suggested by Pauline Madge (1997) green design 
varied from dark green to pale green, “between those who advocated a radical rejection 
of the status quo, a critique of the paradigm of modern industrial society (whether 
capitalist or socialist), and the lighter green idea of modifying existing institutions and 
practices” (p. 46). 
The broadening of the concerns of designers from simply adding environmental 
criteria into existing design processes to critically reconsidering design and industrial 
practice, follows a transition in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s from pale green design 
to the darker green of ecologically sustainable design. For example, as proposed by 
Anne-Marie Willis at the international EcoDesign Conference held at RMIT in 1991, 
“ecodesign has the potential to be more than the reform of existing design, for if taken 
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seriously; it can establish a new foundation for design that could bring economic and 
ecological need into a new union” (Quoted in Madge, 1997, p. 50). 
This transition towards an ethics immanent with design rather than in the form 
of a transcendent moral code, is also supported by Alain Findeli in his 1994 paper 
Ethics, Aesthetics and Design. Findeli (1994), argues that the cartographic mapping of 
the world of artefacts in a topological plane “represents the world of artefacts as a 
continuous space, [which suggests] the possibility of describing it by the means of a 
unified theory” (p. 52). For Findeli (1994) this notion of a continuous topological model 
enables us “to envision continuity between the technological act and the moral act,” 
such that it is “not necessary to leave the field of design in order to construct a general 
problematic of design ethics” (p. 66, 67). Findeli’s argument is representative of the 
transition from green design with its emphasis on the political morality of the designer 
and a professional code of ethics that is external to the design process, to an immanent 
ethos in which ethics and aesthetics can be seen as continuous. In addition, this 
transition greatly broadens the scope of design from simply solving problems to, 
following Ezio Manzini, the concept of the designer as a conceiver of scenarios. The 
influence of Manzini’s work has also played a significant role in the transition towards a 
more continuous diagram of complexity in design. 
In Manzini’s important essay on ecologically sustainable design, first published 
in 1992, one year before Lynn’s Folding in architecture, entitled Prometheus of the 
Everyday: the Ecology of the Artificial and the Designer’s Responsibility, Manzini 
develops an ecological image of the contemporary artificial environment as a dynamic 
system of interacting flows of material and immaterial artefacts, which relate and 
compete with each other within a limited space. According to Manzini (1992/1995, p. 
220), this recognition of products as elements in a complex network of relations carries 
an ethical imperative for the designer to choose to participate in the development of a 
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new strategy of consumer production more favourable to the environment, and therefore 
to a new “sensuous horizon” for design based upon new values and new concepts of 
quality.  
Manzini argues that the reductive, western enlightenment image of thought 
where progress is based on the continual and cumulative domination of nature by reason 
has lost its force today. This “culture of doing” is characterised by Manzini as really an 
idea about the democracy of consumption linking together the notion of well-being with 
increasing quantitive growth. The result of which has been the diffusion of worthless, 
disposable products lacking in cultural or spiritual significance; products which leave no 
trace in our memories but do leave an increasing mountain of rubbish (Manzini, 
1992/1995, p. 222, 225).   
Manzini (1992/1995) maintains that we lack a modern day value system of 
“everyday things”, and what we need is a new approach to design which he portrays as 
an ethics of “minute choices”, where “caring for objects can be a way of caring for that 
larger object that is our planet” (p. 239). Like Findeli, Manzini argues that we need 
concepts that map designs in terms of quality rather than quantity, which in turn enables 
us to understand reality without losing what we have discovered about its irreducible 
complexity. According to Manzini (1992/1995, p. 236), this sense of contemporary 
artificiality requires an ethics and aesthetics that is not based on universal and absolute 
ideals but refers to a system of values exhibiting the consciousness of relativity, and that 
attributes worth to materials and products that in some way are able to embody vestiges 
of their earlier existences. What Manzini is advocating here is an immanent ethics of 
dynamic relations between individuals consistent with the concept of a continuous 




The Isomorphism of the Fold in Architecture and Ecology in Sustainable Design 
The shift in architectural discourse from deconstructivist techniques of collage 
and juxtaposition to the smooth curvalinearity of folded architecture follows a transition 
from a discrete complexity that maintains difference in contradiction, to a continuous 
complexity where difference is “freed” in the intensive folding of continual variation. 
This pattern also emerges in the transition from green design to ecologically sustainable 
design through the shift in design ethics from a transcendental moral code to an 
immanent design ethos of dynamic relations between individuals. We can therefore see 
the isomorphism between Findeli and Manzini’s ethos of ecological mapping in design 
and Lynn’s folded logic of curvalinearity in architecture. This isomorphism, can be 
considered as consistent with the Deleuzian argument and that the emergence of these 
two discourses are informed by the actualisation of the same abstract machine or 
diagram, operating across the disparate fields of architectural form and design ethics. In 
light of these arguments, I argue we can make non-discursive comparisons and develop 
a dialogue of exchange between the disciplines of architecture and design, without 
theorising architecture “as design” or vice versa. This suggests an immanent field of 
design, rather than unity of the two discourses within a transcendent totality. 
Accordingly, design ethics can now be considered through processes of continual 
folding, unfolding and refolding, such that ethics becomes more of a Foucaultian art of 
existence or a style of freedom, where one continually creates and recreates oneself in 
order to give life the most beautiful possible form, both in the eyes of others, of oneself, 
and for future generations (Foucault, 1988a, p. 259). This continuity between ethics and 
aesthetics is maintained by Manzini in his call for a new qualitative sensuous horizon of 
design, because it is through aesthetics that ethics and everyday life are folded. This call 
for a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm in design is reiterated by Deleuze:  
For there is no other aesthetic problem than that of the insertion of art into 
everyday life. The more our daily life appears standardised, stereotyped and 
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subject to an accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption, the more art 
must be injected into it. (1968/2004a, p. 365)  
 
Aesthetics now develops a pragmatic attitude, it becomes functional in that its 
problematic is to reconnect us with the world through the creation of events which in 
turn open us up to the non-human universe of which we form an ineluctable part.  
The concepts of complexity investigated here, the folded logic of curvalinearity 
and the ecological mapping of design, are concepts of a dynamic form of consistency 
between heterogeneous elements, and hence both are inherently temporal concepts. The 
relation between folding in architecture and ecologically sustainable design can be 
further explicated through the investigation of the isomorphism between the design 
techniques of scenario building in design and diagramming in folded architecture, 
techniques which were developed to negotiate the complexity of the contemporary 
environment through engaging time, change, and flexibility (chapter 3.2.). However, in 
order to concretely appreciate the dynamic form of complexity which scenario building 
and diagramming address, we can first examine Deleuze’s distinction between the static 
nature of discrete multiplicities and the inherently temporal nature of continuous 
multiplicities.  
Discrete Multiplicities and Continuous Multiplicities 
Deleuze considers two models of complexity with what he calls discrete 
multiplicities and continuous multiplicities, (also corresponding with the distinction 
between strata and consistencies as examined in chap. 2.3.). These concepts are based 
on Henry Bergson’s reworking of the distinction originally made by the mathematician 
G. B. Riemann between discrete manifolds and continuous manifolds. This distinction 
defines discrete multiplicities as extensive magnitudes whose nature remains the same 
after they are divided, and defines continuous multiplicities as intensive magnitudes 
whose nature is changed each time they are divided. According to Deleuze’s 
interpretation  
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[A discrete multiplicity] is represented by space… It is a multiplicity of 
exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative 
differentiation, of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, 
discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure 
duration: it is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of 
heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a 
virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers. 
(1966/1991, p. 38) 
 
The articulation of the distinction between discrete and continuous multiplicities 
is of significance to Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, because the failure to 
differentiate between the two multiplicities can become the source of transcendent 
illusions. The division between the discrete and the continuous also determines the 
division of complexity into two tendencies, for example the distinction between 
extensive and intensive properties, and between time and duration. By briefly 
examining these concepts, we can gain a greater understanding of the inherently 
dynamic and temporal form of complexity inherent in a continuous multiplicity, with 
which we can better critique the isomorphism of folding in architecture and ecologically 
sustainable design. 
Extensive and Intensive Physical Properties 
Following DeLanda (2002a, p. 26-27), we can understand extensive properties 
as quantitative magnitudes such as length, area, and volume, which can be defined as 
intrinsically divisible. For instance, if we divide a volume of water into two equal 
halves we end up with two volumes, each volume half the extent of the original volume. 
Intensive properties, on the other hand, are properties such as temperature, speed or 
pressure which cannot be divided in the same way. For example, if we take a volume of 
water at 90 degrees of temperature and separate it into two equal parts, we do not end up 
with two volumes at 45 degrees each, but with two volumes at the original temperature. 
However, the temperature of a volume of liquid water can indeed be “divided” by 
heating the container from underneath and creating an intensive temperature difference 
between the top and bottom portions of the liquid. The flow of heat alters the density 
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and the viscosity of the fluid, such that their interactions move the system away from 
equilibrium and change it qualitatively. If the temperature difference is made intense 
enough the system crosses a critical threshold and undergoes a sequence of physical 
changes in kind, the defining expression of a continuous multiplicity. In the terminology 
of complexity science, the system undergoes a cascade of symmetry-breaking 
bifurcations that changes the hydrodynamic flow pattern of the fluid from the bland 
steady-state of thermal conduction, to the cyclic form of thermal convection, to the 
“chaotic” pattern of turbulence and finally a phase transition from liquid to steam. 
 A difference in extension is a static difference because it is a difference in 
quantity, which occurs within the thresholds of a particular phase state. A difference in 
intensity on the other hand, is dynamic and temporal because it involves a sequence of 
events that produce a change in quality or change in state (a symmetry-breaking 
transition as discussed in chap. 2.3.). The distinction between the static nature of 
discrete multiplicities and dynamic nature of continuous multiplicities can also be 
mapped in the distinction between space and time, as discussed in Deleuze’s 
explanation of the notion of time as duration. 
Time and Duration 
According to Deleuze (1966/1991, p. 37), Bergson argues in Time and Free Will 
(1889) and Creative Evolution (1907), that when we conceive of time as a discrete 
multiplicity we are trapped in a spatial concept of time. Bergson argues that instead we 
must consider time as a continuous multiplicity or as duration, that is, as a transition 
that endures a change that is substance in itself. This distinction between the familiar 
form of “clock time” which can be divided into a series of points (seconds, minutes, 
hours etc.) and the continuous form of duration that is irreducible and intensive, can be 
examined for example in the analysis of movement in the well known paradox of 
Zeno’s arrow. According to Boundas, 
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It was Zeno who showed that an arrow will not fly if it has to pass first, one by 
one, all the discrete points at the discrete times of an extended manifold; it will 
not fly because movement cannot be reconstituted on the basis of instants any 
more than being can be reconstituted on the basis of presents… instants, being 
durationless snapshots of movement, cannot be the building blocks of 
movement, because the latter presupposes mobile segments of duration… [it is] 
because a continuum cannot be reduced to a discrete manifold (to an aggregate 
of points) that movement cannot be reduced to that which is static. (1996, p.83) 
 
If a sequence of events in a process has no effect on time, then time becomes 
merely a container for the events happening in it. Such a concept would become the 
denial of time as a change that is substance in itself, and would instead conceive time as 
merely a parameter unaffected by the transformation it describes. Rather, in Deleuze’s 
words (1968/2004a), “Time itself unfolds… instead of things unfolding within it” (p. 
111). According to DeLanda (2002a, p. 102), Deleuze’s interpretation of duration is a 
concept of virtual time, in which the emergence of extensive properties of temporality 
should be treated as an intensive process by which a virtual continuous multiplicity 
(duration) progressively differentiates into actual discontinuous spatio-temporal 
structures (clock time).   
The difference between discrete multiplicities and continuous multiplicities as 
investigated through the distinction, first, between intensive properties and extensive 
properties and second, between space and duration, reveals the inherently temporal 
nature of continuous complexity. The attempt to map this dynamic form of complexity 
has prompted the respective development of temporal design techniques such as 
diagramming in folded architecture and scenario building in design. In chapter 3.2., I 
investigate the continuity between diagramming and scenario building, in order to 
continue my critique the isomorphism of folding in architecture and ecologically 
sustainable design.  
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3.2. Time in Architecture and Design: Mapping Dynamic Complexity 
 
Diagrams in Architecture 
The arguments presented in folded architectural discourses have produced a 
renewed interest in the use of diagrams in the architectural design process. The diagram, 
according to architect and theorist Stan Allen (2000), is a representational technology, 
which has “capacities not only to take measure of the already existing complexity of the 
new urban field, but also intervene productively in the city today with proposals that are 
open and optimistic, devoted to affirmative change rather than commentary and 
critique” (p. 40).17 Allen explains that diagrams, 
Propose an open-ended series of strategies to use within the indeterminate field 
of the contemporary city. They propose new scenarios, provoke unanticipated 
combinations and allow incremental adjustment over time. They leave space for 
tactical improvisation of the user in the field. Whatever coherence is attained is 
always a provisional stabilization of the mobile forces of the city, not set down 
in advance, but developed in practice. (2000, pp. 44-45) 
 
The pragmatic capacity Allen’s description grants, leads towards an 
understanding of the diagram as closer to a technique of strategic planning and 
intervention, rather than as a form of representation. This alternative reading relates to 
the existence of two streams of research in revival of the diagram and diagrammatic 
thinking in architectural discourses. DeLanda (1998, p. 30) locates the first stream of 
research developing from engineering and cognitive science, where diagrams have been 
analysed as a discipline specific form of knowledge, namely visual knowledge, which 
focuses on diagrams as a form of representation able to rapidly convey crucial aspects 
of a particular problem and in turn possible solutions. DeLanda situates the second 
stream of research into diagrams within the philosophy of Deleuze and its subsequent 
architectural interpretations, where the diagram has no intrinsic connection with 
representation and is concerned with the morphogenesis of form.18 The difference 
between these two types of diagram can be understood as related to Deleuze’s 
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distinction between discrete multiplicities and continuous multiplicities, where the 
representational diagram presents the mapping of a static or spatial form of complexity, 
which is opposed to the morphogenetic diagram which maps the inherently dynamic, 
organisation of continuous complexity. The division between these two types of 
diagrams is significant because, as representational diagrams are concerned with a 
spatial and static form of complexity, they cannot be used to map the inherently 
dynamic nature of continuous complexity. 
The division between the operations of representational diagrams and 
morphogenetic diagrams however, is not the reintroduction of essentialism or a dualism 
of opposed and hierarchically divided absolutes. Following Deleuze (1980/1987) we 
can say that while representational diagrams “consist of giving form to matters, of 
imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and 
redundancy… and organizing them into molar aggregates” which is “a very important, 
inevitable phenomenon that is beneficial in many respects and unfortunate in many 
others”, they are unable to negotiate the irreducibility of continuous complexity like 
morphogenetic diagrams (p. 40). 
Representational Diagrams  
The incommensurability between representational and morphogenetic diagrams 
is not always appreciated in some architectural designs associated with folded 
architecture, and can instead be seen as operating in terms of a discrete form of visual 
knowledge. When used as a graphic tool of spatial organisation, functioning in order to 
reduce information such as with bubble diagrams or flow charts, the diagram can be 
seen operating through signs and language. This representational operation functions by 
ordering, dividing, juxtaposing, or stratifying components in a discrete and static space. 
Architectural forms that in turn “trace” such diagrams, as when the “walls” of the built 
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form resemble the drawn lines of the index they are based on, can be argued as mapping 
a discrete form of complexity.  
The situation also occurs, according to Ednie-Brown (2000, p.74), where the 
diagram is inserted as an intermediate step between the intention to build and the built 
result, such as in many designs based on computer aided animations. Although often 
involving impressive and uncontrolled variations which to some extent gives the design 
an experimental edge that is untamed by normative standards, these works in fact still 
fail to overcome the mechanistic model of innovation implied by representational 
diagram, because, by trying to suggest movement in now still form as a kind of memory 
or snap-shot of forces, it ironically brings about a diagramming of Bergson’s concept of 
false or spatial time.  
This criticism is maintained by Sanford Kwinter (1998), who specifically 
criticises “the advent of electronic gadgetry” in architecture for being caught in 
“fashionable neo-mechanisms” (p. 62). Kwinter argues that architects should free 
themselves from the mechanistic paradigm “through the relentless invention of 
techniques whose task is to materialise the incorporeal [map continuous complexity] by 
embedding everything in the flow of time” (p. 62). Kwinter argues that the diagram 
must be durational, not timeless but acting in time and with time, and that one 
misunderstands the diagram when one operates it as a template rather than as a flow. 
Animated moving forms map a spatial concept of time because this technology confuses 
movement with the space that movement passes over, a mistaken understanding which, 
according to Linstead and Mullarkey (2003), “is based on an illusion that space is prior 
to movement, that we move in a container called space” (p. 6). Thus forms which move 
in computer based virtual reality when built in the actual world lose the dynamism of 
their digital animations. Built architectural form precisely does not move, though 
neither is it entirely static – it endures. 
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According to Michael Speaks, Lynn’s argument that “architecture must move” 
from which he develops his practice of “animated form” (Lynn, 1997) through the use 
of computer modelling and animation software, is flawed because Lynn’s animated 
forms appear to interpret the dynamic nature of a continuous multiplicity in terms of a 
spatial concept of time, and not in terms of the qualitative change of duration. Instead, 
Speaks (1998/2001) argues that Lynn should focus on “an animate form of practice” 
rather than “animate forms” (p. 583).  
Morphogenetic Diagrams 
Lynn (1993/2004) appears to anticipate Speaks’ argument for an “animate form of 
practice” in the original publication of Folding in Architecture when he states that 
“rather than speak[ing] of the forms of folding autonomously, it is important to maintain 
a logic rather than a style of curvalinearity” (p.30) and that “diagrams should be 
understood as conceptual techniques that come before any particular technology” 
(1995a, p.17). The significance of Lynn’s contribution to the practice of diagramming 
as “an emerging position in architecture” (Lynn, 1995a, p.18), cannot be 
underestimated.  
Lynn (1995a) finds an example of the operation of morphogenetic diagrams in the 
work of Dutch architect Ben van Berkel, whose practice he situates in “a shift from 
representational concerns toward generative diagrams of open systems of organisation” 
Lynn, p. 24). Lynn (1995a) positions Van Berkel’s work within this emerging territory 
because the “relationship between his conceptual diagrams and concrete constructions is 
non-linear and non-deterministic” (p. 18) such that his designs are positioned in “a 
dynamic rather than static space of relations” (p.19). According to Lynn, “what is 
promising about Van Berkel’s design method is that irreducible forces are rigorously 
conceptualised through the use of abstract diagrams of dynamic systems of 
organisation” from which it follows that “these notations can not be reduced to 
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mathematic or eidetic statements as time and motion are constituent to the organisation” 
(1995, p. 19). While Van Berkel’s use of diagrammatic techniques and “proto-
functional abstractions” are employed to map “forces, behaviours and relationships that 
are inherently dynamic and indeterminate” (Lynn, 1995a, p. 18), Van Berkel explains 
that,  
It is not the form that has become fluid; it is the intensive intermingling of 
programme, events, organisational structuring and architectural formation that 
result in a liquid typology… [structures today] are losing their specific, separate 
properties and are defined more by how they relate to the organisation of the 
whole and how you relate to them… space opens up around you; any variety of 
mutations are possible, all unquantifiable, orderless, dimensionless, happening as 
in a fluidum. (Ben van Berkel quoted in Lynn, 1995b, p. 15) 
 
This implies that Van Berkel’s “abstract diagrams are the negotiators of concrete 
buildings and concepts” which while “resisting a reductive approach… neither rejects 
systematic thought nor retreats into the domain of naïve intuition or craft’ (Lynn, 1995a, 
p. 21, 20). Following Lynn’s analysis we can see van Berkel’s operation of a 
morphogenetic form of diagram as mapping the inherently dynamic organisation of 
continuous complexity.  
This shift from a representational form of practice toward an open-ended series of 
strategies and tactical improvisations whose concrete constructions are always a 
provisional stabilization of mobile forces, consequently implies a shift in design 
processes from one of solving clearly defined problems, to framing the right questions. 
As DeLanda (1998) writes, “It is only through skilful problem-posing that we can begin 
to think diagrammatically” (p.34). 
A correlative transition toward design techniques that can map a continuous 
model of complexity can be seen in ecologically sustainable design through Ezio 
Manzini’s the concept of the designer as a conceiver of scenarios. The associated 
practices of scenario building and the investigation of techniques of dematerialisation in 
product-service combinations have developed in recognition of advantage of extending 
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product life-spans through the creation of enduring products that are precisely designed 
to be embedded in the flow of time.   
Product Endurance and Long-Life Design 
Sustainability in design is a temporal concept that is linked to the idea of 
sustainable development, in which human activity is conducted in a manner so as to 
maintain the environment and quality of life for future generations. The concept of 
sustainability developed as an alternative to throwaway culture and refers to the ability 
of ecosystems to maintain a form of dynamic stability which enables them to continue 
over long periods of time. Ecosystems are complex temporal structures involving 
processes operating simultaneously at varying temporal scales which develop resilience 
through using scale and time strategically. At large scales change happens slowly, and 
at smaller scale change happen faster. This way shocks to the system are responded to 
more quickly at smaller scales, whereas larger scales maintain the overall continuity. 
Such that, as Thorp (2004, p. 220) describes, having “varying rates of change within the 
ecosystem help sustain it.”  
The concept of diversity of time scales in the ecological model has also been 
interpreted in design in terms of product endurance. In response to the implication of a 
limited environment, the simple strategy of consuming less by extending the life span of 
products in order to need fewer of them seems a valid solution. However it was soon 
discovered that “making a product last long” is different from “making a longer lasting 
product” (van Hinte, 2004, p. 53). 
Long lasting products are precisely not eternal products that resist time, but 
products that have a kind of life to them, products that can endure. In contrast with 
enduring products, eternal products according to Bruce Sterling (2004), “never lose 
their value, are never cheap, never antique, never collectible, always the same, they are 
timeless and in some profound sense dead” (p. 190). 
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 Product durability has been investigated through a variety of different means, 
involving individualisation, personalisation and through the attempted development of 
attachment between users and products, however these strategies, though sometimes 
effective, have often resulted in no more than romantic clichés or gimmicks. 
The design of enduring products is more closely related to flexibility with regard 
to change. This has been investigated by designing products to be resilient to changes in 
technology and events, through the understanding of products as “ecological” 
assemblages of elements which can evolve at different timescales. The practice of 
which has been undertaken through allowing for upgradability and repair, and a move to 
dematerialization though product-service combinations.  
The motives for the replacement of still functioning products are diverse, but in 
general it is simply related to the peoples’ desire for well functioning and up-to-date 
products that can meet their changing needs. This implies that design for longevity 
requires anticipating upcoming possibilities and potential defects, through the creation 
of dynamic and flexible products which incorporate opportunities for variability and 
which are prepared for easy future upgrading and repair. The flexibility of enduring 
products is related to the flow of time and not the “flexibility” represented by curved 
forms or computer animations. The flexibility required by enduring products and 
product-service combinations implies that their design is in some way “never finished” 
or completely definitive. Because there is an active openness to unanticipated 
variations, this requires a design process that becomes closer to a form of strategic 
planning or scenario building, a form of abstraction that is generative rather than 
reductive which can be considered in relation to the function of the morphogenetic 




Mapping Complexity with Scenario Building 
The techniques of scenario building or scenario planning have been productively 
investigated as tools for strategic planning in ecologically sustainable design discourses, 
particularly in response to questions of how to facilitate the transition from the current 
system of production towards a sustainable system, while managing the transition such 
that it would not also entail a social catastrophe along the way. Manzini argues that the 
potential to activate this transition requires designers and business, and also ordinary 
people to give a “strategic orientation” to their activities, and that it will require 
considerable planning skills: the ability to generate visions of a sustainable socio-
technical system; to organise it into a coherent system of regenerative products 
and services or sustainable solutions; and to communicate these visions and 
systems adequately so that they are recognised and appreciated by a wide enough 
public to render them practicable. (2003, p. 51 emphasis in the original) 
 
Following Manzini (2003), scenario building is then a design technique that 
entails the development of a “set of visions” or diagrams of certain contexts in the 
future under certain conditions, which are employed to accommodate multiple and 
complex elements such that it “not only allows us to overcome the limits of intuition 
and more simplistic modelling, but also puts us in a better position to choose with 
awareness and talk our options through in a participatory planning process” (p. 136). 
Manzini’s characterisation of scenario building can be seen as related to the animated 
form of practice argued for by Speaks, who states that 
Scenario planning attempts to project scenarios of possible futures… in order to 
access and make visible virtual paths… which are constructed from analyzing 
the turbulent environment itself. Scenario planning is not predictive, however, 
not employed to reduce disorder, thus making the right path or plan obvious. 
Instead, scenario planning… enhances its own flexibility and adaptability to 
conditions over which it has no control. (2001, p. 586)  
 
Scenario planning can be seen as a core activity which supports a shift in the nature of 
design processes from one of solving clearly defined problems, to one of skilful 
decision making and problem-posing, that allows design more flexibility and 
adaptability to the complexity and uncertainty of future situations. Scenario building 
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can be considered as a design technique which operates in order to map the dynamic 
nature of continuous complexity, and can therefore be seen as isomorphic with the 
techniques of morphogenetic diagramming in folded architecture.  
Immanence and Transcendence in Design Research  
The isomorphism investigated here between folding in architecture and 
ecologically sustainable design and their respective design techniques of the diagram 
and the scenario suggests that the two disciplines can be considered as emerging 
through the transition from a discrete to a continuous model of complexity. Following 
Deleuze’s schizoanalytical method, the emergence and isomorphism of these two 
discourses can be seen to be informed by the divergent actualisation of an abstract 
machine. 
 We can understand the isomorphism of folded architecture and ecologically 
sustainable design, as a process of divergent actualisation in the same manner as that of 
the morphogenesis of the soap bubble and salt crystal as described in chapter 2.3.3., 
where a single immanent topological form is actualised in different actual forms. In the 
same manner that the spherical shape of a soap bubble and the cubic shape of a salt 
crystal do not resemble the topological form which they actualise, nor do their actual 
forms resemble each other, accordingly the isomorphism between folding and 
architecture and ecologically sustainable design must not be considered as a form of 
resemblance or identity. It is not the case an essence of “continuousness” somehow 
imposing an ideal form on a passive and receptive body from some kind of Platonic 
outside, but as a dynamic historical process of production whereby the discourses are 
defined by their response to events, how they are affected by active transformations, 
rather than on their possession to a set of static properties. 
This follows the argument that design discourses are emergent structures 
produced when an intensive flow reaches certain thresholds that activate self-ordering 
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as real aspects of the world, consistent with the realist commitment to capturing features 
of the world rather than modelling phenomena.  
This implies an immanent and continuous field of design research rather than the 
unification of architecture and design within a transcendent totality. A unified design 
theory is an essentialist combination of the many and the one, whereas a continuous 
territory is “an organisation belonging to the many as such, which has no need 
whatsoever of unity in order to form a system” (Deleuze, 1968/2004a, p. 230) which 
instead inhabits a space characterised by “immanence of field without transcendent 
unification, continuity of line without global centralisation and contiguity of parts 
without distinct totalization” (Deleuze, 1988/1986, p. 27).  Consequently, an immanent 
field of design research enables exchange and dialogue in a manner that does not reduce 
either discipline’s independence.  
In light of these arguments, we can investigate a design process immanent to 
both architecture and design, as implied by the shift from solving clearly defined 
problems to “thinking diagrammatically” through careful problem-posing, in a non-
metaphoric and non-essentialist way. In chapter 3.3. I investigate the nature of this 
immanent design process in relation to Deleuze’s distinction between the axiomatic 
method of Royal science and the problematic method of Minor science.  
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3.3. Conceptualisation: Design Processes and the Science of Multiplicities 
 
The diagram and scenario are temporal design techniques that attempt to intervene 
in the world while respecting its irreducible complexity. This approach to negotiating 
complexity is, in Deleuze’s terms, due to the fact that the discrete, extensive properties 
of actual systems cannot be used to predict the continuous structure of the intensive 
processes that produced it. An actual product that has reached equilibrium, steady state 
or stable conditions “hides” the intensive far-from-equilibrium process that gave rise to 
it. For example, at a human time-scale, the “static” extensive structure of a mountain 
hides the intensive process of tectonic folding which generates it. 
 A design project that is faced with this irreducible complexity, such as coaxing the 
transition from an unsustainable system of production to a sustainable socio-technical 
system, requires a design process that can “diagram” this complexity in a generative 
rather than reductive fashion. Such systems are described as irreducible because a 
complex system cannot be reduced to an aggregate of points, and any attempt to 
summarise the workings of a complex system in terms of fundamental, essential 
principles is bound to fail. As Cilliers (1998) explains “a complex system cannot be 
reduced to a collection of basic constituents, not because a system is not constituted by 
them but because too much of the relational information gets lost in the process” (p. 10). 
This relates to the status of prediction within complex systems. According to Bonta and 
Protevi (2004, p. 23), interventions which aim to control complex systems exactly 
cannot be made, for two reasons. First, because complex systems are sensitive to initial 
conditions due to the cascading affects of miniscule measurement errors. Second, 
because some complex systems create new presentations of behaviours as they go 
along. This creative aspect renders the reductive analysis and then aggregation of unit 
behaviours unable to account for emergent effects. 
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Because complex systems are so sensitive to perturbations, even the slightest 
disturbance can build up to a major effect. This means that consequently, complex 
systems have short-term predictability and long-term unpredictability (also called 
deterministic chaos). A familiar example is the weather. The Meteorological Office has 
a very complex and detailed mathematical model of the Earth’s atmosphere with which 
it analyses data from weather stations all over the world, which enable them to solve 
complex differential equations on their computer and so forecast the weather for about a 
week in advance. If the Earth’s weather system was a closed system (discrete 
complexity), it follows that by simply increasing the number of weather stations and the 
power of the computers they should be able to extend their forecasts as long as they 
want. However, because the weather is a complex heterogeneous system that is driven 
by intensive differences, the system can spontaneously produce changes in kind or 
emergent effects that cannot be reduced to an aggregate of points, such that the smallest 
errors in the computer model quickly build up making it unpredictable in the long-term.  
This sensitivity to initial conditions, discovered by Edward Lorenz with his 
famous butterfly effect, however presents a notion of limited unpredictability and not 
total chaos. I can effectively predict that the temperature in Lower Hutt on Waitangi 
Day 2010 will be between 10-40 degrees centigrade, meaning that the trajectory of the 
system (the weather pattern) frequently exhibits roughly the same behaviour but never 
exactly the same and never in exactly the same sequence of events.19 Consequently 
exact solutions cannot be attained so problems have to be resolved as Deleuze says, in 
“real-life operations”. This implies an epistemological shift that Deleuze highlights 
through the distinction between problematics and axiomatics, the concerns of Minor 
science and Royal science respectively. This distinction in turn reveals the trajectories 
of two different theories of design processes. 
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Problematics and Axiomatics 
 We can begin our analysis of the distinction that Deleuze makes between 
problematics and axiomatics with the investigation of Deleuze’s examination of the 
ontology of mathematics. Deleuze’s examination is not only concerned with 
mathematics but also refers to the reduction of ethicism to moralism, continuous to the 
discrete, the intensive to the extensive, abstraction to signification and immanence to 
transcendence, a theme investigated throughout this paper. Accordingly, Deleuze is not 
arguing against axiomatics and indeed claims that the translation of problematics into 
axiomatics is not only inevitable but scientifically necessary, 
What we have, rather, are two formally different conceptions of science, and, 
ontologically, a single field of interaction in which royal science [axiomatics] 
continually appropriates the contents of vague or nomad science [problematics] 
while nomad science cuts the contents of royal science loose. (1980/1987, p. 367).  
 
As Daniel W. Smith (2003b) explains, Deleuze’s distinction between 
problematics and axiomatics or theorematics, reflects a tension within the history of 
mathematics that goes as far back as Greek geometry, where theorems “concern the 
demonstration from axioms or postulates, of the inherent properties belonging to the 
figure, [whereas] problems concern the construction of figures using a straightedge and 
a compass” (p. 415). Accordingly, theorematics and problematics concern two different 
forms of deduction.  
In theorematics, deduction moves from axioms to theorems that are derived from 
it, whereas in problematics a deduction moves from the problem to the ideal 
accidents or events that condition the problems and form the cases that resolve 
it… Whereas in theorematics a figure is defined statistically, in platonic fashion, 
in terms of essence and its derived properties, in problematics a figure is defined 
dynamically by its capacity to be affected – that is by the events that befall it, 
cutting, projecting, folding, bending, rotating, stretching. (Smith, 2003b, p. 415) 
 
For example, axiomatics defines a circle as an organic and fixed essence, but the 
morphological variations of circles (“lens-shaped”, “umbelliform”) form problematic 




 The axiomatics of royal science are concerned with fixed essences whereas the 
problematics of minor science are concerned with vague or morphological essences. 
Deleuze (1979, para. 17) argues that vague essences are inexact not by chance or by 
defect but because they are rigorously vague or anexact. Nevertheless Deleuze (1979) 
claims that vague essences possess a corporeality (materiality) which is not the same as 
sensible things (a wheel, a vase) or essences (the circle), but a corporeality that is on one 
hand “inseparable from processes of deformation of the event type of which it is the 
site, and on the other hand it is inseparable from types of qualities susceptible to greater 
or lesser intensities: colour, density, weight etc” (para. 18). A circle is a fixed essence, a 
plate or a wheel is a sensible formed thing, whereas a vague essence would be 
roundness, an essence that is inseparable from a process it undergoes: “roundness is 
simply the result, or the passage to the limit, of the process of rounding” (Deleuze, 
1979, para. 19).  
Rounding does not imply a fixed formal essence as described in Euclidean 
geometry, but a “passage to the limit, for example: the series of polygons of which the 
circle would be the limit” (Deleuze, 1979, para. 19; See Symmetry-Breaking Transitions 
chap. 2.3. and Table 3). Consequently, anexact essences are defined by dynamic events, 
or a symmetry-breaking transition, which Deleuze claims already implies the operation 
of the hand in constant correction (rectification, straightening) through operations of 
deformation. Deleuze’s examination of vague essences implies a concept of matter as 
heterogeneous and dynamic, carrying implicit forms that are connected to “real life 
operations”. 
Metallurgy and the Heterogeneity of Matter 
Deleuze’s claim that vague essences possess a materiality that is inseparable from 
dynamic events, implies that matter is heterogeneous and capable of self-ordering, a 
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concept that is in opposition to the notion (from the classical physics of Newton which 
can be traced back to Plato) of matter as simply mass, that is, as homogenous, mutable, 
inert and obedient. The distinction between matter as homogenous and inert, and matter 
as heterogeneous and carrying “implicit forms” or vague essences, also reveals two 
trajectories of design processes, the transcendent design process of royal science and the 
immanent design process of minor science. 
Deleuze (1980/1987) argues, following the work of philosopher of technology 
Gilbert Simondon, that the axiomatic method of royal science follows the hylomorphic 
model (hyle meaning matter and morphic meaning form) which follows a production 
method that implies “both a form that organises matter and a matter prepared for the 
form” (p. 369) it “assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed homogenous” (p. 408). 20 
Deleuze argues that hylomophic model is concerned with the idea of the law or 
command which submits matter to a form. 
This distinction between royal and minor design processes, according to Protevi 
(2001) can be understood as the difference between the “transcendent imposition of an 
architects vision of form on chaotic matter” (p.7) and the artisans approach, which 
follows the flow of matter by “subordinating all their operations to the sensible 
conditions of intuition and construction” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 373). 
Deleuze (1980/1987) distinguishes between these two types of design processes as that 
of a difference between reproducing and following. 
Reproducing implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to 
what is reproduced: watching the flow from the bank. But following is 
something different from the ideal of reproduction. One is obliged to follow 
when one is in the search for ‘singularities’ of a matter, or rather of a material, 
and not out to discover form… when one engages in the continuous variation of 
variables, instead of extracting constants.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 
372) 
 
  In the hylomorphic method of royal science, the design process is “primarily 
conceptual or cerebral, something to be generated as a pure thought in isolation from the 
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messy world of matter and energy” (DeLanda, 2001, p. 132). Once conceived, a design 
can be given form simply by imposing it on a material substrate, which is taken to be 
homogenous and receptive to the designer’s wishes.  
Modern steel can be seen as such a homogenous and inert material because of its 
standardised, docile, predictable and routine behaviour. According to James E. Gordon, 
The widespread use of steel for so many purposes on the modern world is only 
partly due to technical causes. Steel, especially mild steel, might euphemistically 
be described as a material that facilitates the dilution of skills… Manufacturing 
processes can be broken down into many separate stages, each requiring a 
minimum of skill or intelligence… At a higher mental level, the design process 
becomes a good deal easer and more foolproof by the use of ductile, isotropic, and 
practically uniform material with which there is already a great deal of 
accumulated experience. The design of many components, such as gears and 
wheels, can be reduced to a routine that can be looked up in handbooks. One 
consequence has been that managers and accountants, rather than engineers [or 
designers], have become the dominant personalities in large organisations. 
Creative thinking is directed into rather narrow channels. Steel is archetypically, 
the material of big business – of large factories, railroads and so on. (James E. 
Gordon cited in DeLanda, 2001, p. 132) 
 
 However, Deleuze (1979) argues that in fact the homogeneity of modern steel and 
the routine design processes it imposes is not an essential property of the material but 
because the intensive capacities of modern steel have become stratified and overcoded; 
an effect of royal science’s transcendent illusion of matter as mutable, obedient mass 
and “its theorematic apparatus and its organisation of work” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 374). In fact, Deleuze (1979) claims that metal “is what compels us to 
think matter in continuous variation…as continuous variation of form and the 
continuous variation of matter itself” (para. 31). Before the advent of homogenised 
metals like modern steel, the ancient blacksmith had to work with metals that were 
always heterogeneous. One week he would get his iron from one mine, another different 
mine the next week, a meteor later on, meaning that each time he would have to deal 
with different impurities and mixtures. Consequently this demanded a “sensitivity” that 
could take the complexity of heterogeneous materials into account, and accordingly, a 
design process which could not be reduced to a routine. As Cyril Stanley Smith relates  
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The craftsman [blacksmith] can compensate for differences in the qualities of his 
materials, for he can adjust the precise strength and application of his tools to the 
materials local vagaries. Conversely the constant motion of the machine requires 
constant materials. (Cited in DeLanda, 2001, p.136)    
 
This presents an immanent philosophy of design where materials are not seen as 
inert receptacles for the imposition of form, but active participants in the design process. 
This implies materials that are heterogeneous, meaning that they have variable 
properties and idiosyncrasies that the designer must respect and make integral to the 
design process, which it follows cannot itself be reduced to routine. In the hylomorphic 
model of royal science,  
operations occur between two thresholds, one of which constitutes the matter 
prepared for the operation, and the other the form to be incarnated… In 
metallurgy, on the other hand, the operations are always astride the thresholds, so 
that the energetic materiality overspills the prepared matter, and a qualitative 
deformation or transformation overspills the form. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 410) 
 
 The thresholds Deleuze is referring to are critical points of intensity or vague 
essences, which by crossing (following a “line of flight”) triggers a spontaneous change 
to occur in the structure of the material (in complexity theory terms, a bifurcation), like 
phase transitions such as the condensation of steam in liquid droplets, or the 
crystallisation of water into ice at critical points of temperature. 
 The minor science of the blacksmith knew about phase transitions in metals and 
that how one crosses these critical points is important, though this knowledge was 
linguistically unarticulated knowledge or “know-how”. For example, once metal is 
melted it matters how fast it is allowed to solidify, whether it is left to air-cool slowly 
(annealing) or whether this processes is accelerated by plunging it into cold water 
(quenching). In one case you end up with a regular crystalline structure and in the other 
a more irregular glass like material. Similarly, the blacksmith knew that a piece of metal 
can be made to change its behaviour, from hard and ductile to strong and brittle, by 
hammering it while cold. The opposite transmutation, from hard to ductile could be 
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achieved by heating the metal and then allowing it to cool slowly. Both these properties 
may be desirable in different tools and even in the same tool, for instance, the sword 
and knife requires the body to be ductile while the cutting edge must be hard. The 
properties of hardness or toughness, in Deleuze’s terms traits of expression, and in turn 
their usefulness in the tool (its capacity to affect or be affected), are emergent properties 
that result from operations “astride” thresholds and a material containing vague 
essences or “implicit forms”. We can now understand matter as a dynamic material 
capable of spontaneously generating different structures according to specific 
singularities which are brought out as the artisan moves the material across specific 
critical points by manipulating its intensity.  
The concept of a dynamic and heterogeneous matter carrying implicit forms can 
be found in wood as well, for example where the carpenter negotiates the grain of the 
wood when making a piece of furniture. The carpenter “follows” the traits of expression 
of the material by working in partnership with its inherent properties, for example by 
sanding the wood with the grain. This design technique does not correspond to an 
axiomatic or transcendent law (there is no law that you must sand with the grain) but 
instead corresponds to a problematic or “designerly” way of knowing. We can now 
understand Deleuze when he argues that, 
Simondon exposes the technological insufficiency of the matter-form model, in 
that it assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed homogenous. It is the idea of 
the law that assures the model’s coherence, since laws are what submit matter to 
this or that form, and conversely, realize in matter a given property deduced 
from that form. But Simondon demonstrates that the hylomorphic model leaves 
many things, active and affective, by the wayside. On the one hand, to the 
formed and formable matter we must add an entire energetic materiality in 
movement, carrying singularities or haecceties that are already like implicit 
forms that are topological, rather than geometrical, and that combine with 
processes of deformation: for example, the variable undulations and torsions of 
the fibres guiding the operation of splitting wood. On the other hand, to the 
essential properties of matter deriving from the formal essence we must add 
variable intensive affects, now resulting from the operation, now on the contrary 
making it possible: for example, wood that is more or less porous, more or less 
elastic and resistant. At any rate it is a question of surrendering to the wood, then 
following where it leads by connecting operations to a materiality, instead of 
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imposing a form upon matter: what one addresses is less a matter submitted to 
laws than a materiality possessing a nomos. One addresses less a form capable 
of imposing properties upon a matter than material traits of expression 
constituting affects. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 408, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
Minor Science and Hylomorphism 
 Deleuze assimilates axiomatics to royal science, the science of the royal societies 
and the most famous of scientists (which he links to the social axiomatic of capitalism 
or the State), whereas Deleuze claims that problematics have their source in minor 
sciences such as metallurgy, carpentry, surveying, stonecutting, and perspective. 
However, minor sciences are tied to the coding and formalising of royal science, which 
constantly tries to affect the reduction or repression of problematics to axiomatics, with 
the effect of “deprive[ing] them of their own model, and allow[ing] them to exist only 
in the capacity of ‘technologies’ or ‘applied science’” (Deleuze 1980/1987, p. 373). 
Minor sciences do not claim an autonomous power like Royal science, because  
they subordinate all their operations to the sensible conditions of intuition and 
construction – following the flow of matter, drawing and linking up smooth space. 
Everything is situated in the objective zone of fluctuation that is coextensive with 
reality itself. However refined or rigorous, “approximate knowledge” is still 
dependent upon sensitive and sensible evaluations that pose more problems than 
they solve. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 373, emphasis in the original)  
 
The minor sciences are concerned with “inventing problems whose solution is tied 
to a whole set of collective, non-scientific activities but whose scientific solution 
depends, on the contrary, on royal science” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 374, 
emphasis in the original). Minor sciences are linked to notions such as heterogeneity, 
dynamism, continuous variation, flows; that are “barred” or “banned” by royal science, 
which must then transpose problematic knowledge into axiomatic knowledge, “by 
introducing it into its theorematic apparatus and its organisation of work” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 374, emphasis in the original). However the minor sciences can 
never be fully reduced to royal science, and demands its own status and rigor. When we 
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maintain the primacy of royal science we cannot understand the relation between 
science and technology or science and practice, because minor science is not a simple 
technology or practice, but a scientific field in which these relationships are bought out 
and resolved in an entirely different way (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 367). 
The distinction between the problematics of minor science and the hylomorphism 
of royal science implies that we must see matter in constant movement and carrying 
“implicit forms”, potentials for self-ordering that the artisan negotiates, such that the 
form must be seen as suggested by matter rather than as the pure product of the mind of 
the architect. In minor science, the artisan must therefore “surrender” to matter, that is, 
follow its singularities by attending to its traits, and devise operations that bring forth 
those potentials to actualise the desired properties. The “architect” is blind to such traits 
of a complex heterogeneous matter, and despises surrendering to matter; he only sees 
and commands.21  
This distinction between surrender and command implies that the hylomophic 
model “derives less from technology or life than from a society divided into governors 
and governed” (Deleuze, 1980/1987, p. 369). As Simondon (quoted in Protevi, 2001) 
explains, “the hylomorphic schema corresponds to the knowledge of someone who 
stays outside the workshop and only considers what goes in and what comes out of it” 
(p. 8) it is the notion of the master commanding slave labour, 
What the hylomorphic schema reflects in the first place is a socialised 
representation of work… The technical operation which imposes a form upon a 
passive and indeterminate matter is… essentially the operation commanded by the 
free man and executed by the slave. (Simondon, quoted in Protevi, 2001, p. 8) 
   
Hylomorphic representation therefore resonates with fascist desire: the leader comes 
from on high to rescue the chaos of the people by his imposition of order.  
The Diagram, the Scenario, and the Science of Multiplicities  
The shift in design processes from mechanical representation to the diagrammatic 
practice in folded architecture, and from solving clearly defined problems to conceiving 
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scenarios in ecologically sustainable design, can be understood as a transition from the 
axiomatic approach of royal science to the problematic approach of minor science. In 
addition, royal science and minor science imply two different models for the 
relationship between matter and form. The hylomorphic model of royal science 
presupposes matter as a homogenous mass that is obedient to laws and an inert vessel 
for forms imposed from the outside. The artisanal model of minor science, on the other 
hand, can negotiate matter in non-linear, intensive and complex conditions, where 
matter is capable of spontaneously creating form, drawing on its inherent tendencies and 
capacities to affect and be affected. This implies an intimate relationship between 
epistemology and ontology, where the problems posed by humans become isomorphic 
with the dynamic process of material systems.  
Problematics presents a design process through which designers and architects can 
negotiate the irreducible complexity of the contemporary environment without falling 
victim to the transcendent illusions of essentialist and universal absolutes. The diagram 
and scenario can instead be seen as design processes that “overturns Platonism” through 









This part draws together the general conclusions for the research presented in this 
thesis, and reflects on the themes that have been investigated and addressed. It then 
considers the limitations of the work and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
In response to the research presented, we should be sceptical of any brand of 
environmentalism or sustainable design in which social and natural harmony is based on 
essentialist, universal “laws of nature”. Solutions to environmental issues in design 
discourses cannot be sought either externally to power in a transcendent position or 
“behind” problems of industrial production in an essentialist Nature. Instead, design 
ethics can be seen as the practice of developing an ethos, which considers ethical 
evaluations as always already folded in a multiplicity of immanent power relations 
which can be both repressive and enabling. This ecological aesthetics of existence 
becomes a never-ending activity in which tactics and problems are constantly re-
evaluated and adapted to changing circumstances and which seeks to invent new forms 
of life through the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis. 
Such a design ethos requires an ethico-aesthetic design theory inherent within 
the shift from solving clearly defined problems to “thinking diagrammatically” through 
careful problem-posing. This shift in design processes can be understood as a transition 
from the axiomatic approach of royal science to the problematic approach of minor 
science, and consequently two different models for the relationship between matter and 
form. Rather than the hylomorphism of the axiomatic model which presupposes matter 
as a homogenous mass obedient to the imposition of forms from the outside, the 
problematic design process enables the designer to follow matter in non-linear, 
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intensive and complex conditions, by creating form through partnership with matter’s 
inherent tendencies and capacities to affect and be affected.  
Problematics presents a design process through which designers and architects can 
negotiate the irreducible complexity of the contemporary environment without falling 
victim to the transcendent illusions of essentialist and universal absolutes. This intimate 
relationship between epistemology and ontology, whereby problems posed by designers 
become isomorphic with the dynamic process of material systems, enables us to 
understand the relation between design and issues of the environment in a different way. 
Through the affirmation of pragmatic experimentation, continual variation and intensive 
difference, Deleuze provides the philosophical concepts for an immanent and anti-
essentialist design ethics and aesthetics which can enable mutually beneficial conceptual 
exchange between architecture and design discourses. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 It has been seen that Deleuze’s philosophy provides an innovative and powerful 
“toolbox” of concepts that can aid the designer to intervene and experiment in the 
indeterminate field of the contemporary environment. However, the experimental style 
of Deleuze’s writing, can lead to the mistake of associating his work with the more 
textural concerns of post-modernism and the misunderstanding of his commitment to a 
realist ontology. This confusion can limit the potential for interactive reflection between 
Deleuze’s philosophy and the arguably more empirical concerns of industrial design and 
its relation to issues of the environment.  
This research has attempted to address this problem through a selective 
interpretation of Deleuze’s philosophy as informed by the sciences of complexity. 
While this strategy may have been successful to a certain degree, the use of difficult and 
debatable scientific concepts in turn, may have limited the extent to which this research 
has “clarified” Deleuze’s concepts for design research. This difficulty is also 
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compounded by the fact that the extension of the notion of self-organising systems to 
the socio-technical domain of design research is currently unable to be scientifically 
proven. This subsequently influences the extent to which we can claim an immanent 
field of design research rather than the simpler but misleading conclusion of the 
unification of the disciplines of architecture and design.  
 The parallel transition towards a problematic epistemology in design processes 
presented in this paper, suggests a rich conceptual site for future research. The 
significant history and debate regarding the relationship between design and science, for 
example the Design Methods Movement of the 1960’s, suggests a promising reading of 
“the sciences of the artificial” in relation to Deleuze’s distinction between axiomatics 
and problematics. This research path has potential to contribute to the discussion 
between the need for a systematic approach to design and the reduction of the sensible 




What we most lack is a belief in the world, we've quite lost the world, it's been 
taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however 
inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small 
their surface or volume. It's what you call pietas. Our ability to resist control, or 
our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need 










                                                 
1
 However in order for these processes to not become essences in turn, Deleuze introduces his concept of 
multiplicity (see DeLanda 2002 p. 9-44 for an extended and in-depth analysis of Deleuze concepts of 
multiplicity) 
2
 Foucault only attempted to systematically reconstruct his method in his last book of this period – The 
Archaeology of Knowledge – and so it should be noted that archaeology is not a single coherent theory 
from which flowed his studies of madness (Foucault 1961, 1963) and the human sciences (Foucault 
1966), but the emergence of an indistinct methodology from the reworking of specific historical case 
studies. 
3
 As Deleuze states in his Foucault (1986/1988) “If Foucault’s interviews form an integral part of his 
work, it is because they extend the historical problematization of each of his books into the construction 
of the present problem, be it madness, punishment or sexuality” (p. 115). This is also in line with 
Deleuze’s (1995) comment that a philosopher’s work must be taken “as a whole” (p. 85). 
4
 The term sciences of complexity should understood as a catch all term for the scientific researches into 
non-linear dynamics and complex adaptive systems beginning in the 20th century, which “investigate the 
way certain material systems in the inorganic, organic and social registers attain both higher levels of 
internal complexity and a ‘focus’ of systemic behaviour without having to relay on external organising 
agents” (Bonta & Protevi, 2004, p. 3).  
5
 For a map of Deleuze’s continually varying terminology see Appendix: Deleuze’s Words in DeLanda, 
2002a, pp. 157-180; for an in-depth glossary of Deleuze’s concepts from A Thousand Plateaus see Bonta 
and Protevi, 2004. 
6
 As DeLanda (2003) argues, who is also an artist as well as a philosopher “take for example his [Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1980/1987, Chap. 10, 11] affirmation that all great art involves a becoming-animal of one sort 
or another. What would this mean if we cannot say what in reality these becomings are? (They are 
transformations not of organisms, like werewolves, but of the virtual multiplicities underlying the 
organisms). Or take the line of flight (also called the quasi-causal operator): this is the entity that builds 
the plane of consistency out of multiplicities. But without this definition (and the rest of the ontology) 
could we understand what it means to follow a line of flight in painting or music?” (Pt. III, para. 22) 
7
 Despite the fact that this interpretation misses the point of Derrida’s early essay ‘force and signification’ 
and the asignifying nature of the general text (Bonta & Protevi, 2004, p. 7). 
8
 See Sokal, Alan, and Bricmont, Jean. (1998). Fashionable nonsense: Postmodern intellectuals and the 
abuse of science. New York: Picador 
9
 Deleuze wrote four books with Guattari, including A Thousand Plateaus part two of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1980/1987) which I refer to extensively throughout this chapter. However, I will cite 
Deleuze’s collaborative work with Guattari by referring just to Deleuze in the text but to both authors in 
the citations. 
10
 The process of double articulation is developed from Louis Hjelmslev’s linguistics but Deleuze is not 
suggesting that language, which is the focus of Hjelmslev’s enterprise, somehow structures matter and 
organises life. “Despite what Hjelmslev himself may have said, the net [of Hjelmslev’s apparatus] is not 
linguistic in scope or origin” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 43). For a close examination of 
Deleuze’s interpretation of Hjelmslev concepts see McClure (2001, Chap. 6.4) 
11
 I will follow DeLanda (1992, pp. 142, 150, 157; 1997, pp. 57-70; 1999, pp. 122-128) in the next 
examples, so will not apply specific references in the text.  
12
 Deleuze calls the second articulation folding (1980/1987, p. 41), however as DeLanda (1999, p. 133) 
points out, at this scale the proper term is cementation. However this does not undermine Deleuze’s 
argument and in fact shows how Deleuze’s concept operates at different spatio-temporal scales.  
13
 An important difference between organic and inorganic stratification should noted whereby processes 
of selection in the organic sphere are not exterior and as in the case of sedimentary rock, but implicated in 
the organism (DNA). Also a crucial distinction between geological and organic strata is the former’s 
tendency to accumulate around points of static equilibrium, as opposed to the latter’s tendency develop 
form of dynamic equilibrium. (DeLanda, 1992, p.152) 
14
 This is why DeLanda refers to Difference and repetition (1968) as Deleuze’s most important book, as it 
is here that Deleuze develops the core philosophical concepts that he then refines and extends in his later 
work. The three books where Deleuze discusses the concept of the diagram is most explicitly, are 
concerned with a variety of subject matter; namely in his Foucault (1986/1988) where Deleuze is 
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concerned with Foucault’s analysis of the form of disciplinary society exemplified by the architectural 
form of the Panopticon; in Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation (1981/2002), Deleuze’s book on the 
aesthetics of painter Francis Bacon, and thirdly in his collaboration work with Felix Guattari  A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980/1987). Because Deleuze developed the concept of the diagram as a critique of 
representational thinking, as well as offering an original theory of the genesis of form, that there is 
sometimes confusion of the properly ‘Deleuzian’ operation of the diagram as opposed the traditional 
representational diagram in architectural and design processes. For as Foucault (1975/1977) reminds us, 
the panoptic ‘dream building’ was but a “diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its 
functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure 
architectural and optical system: it is in fact a political technology that may and must be detached from 
any specific use.” (p. 205) 
15
 In this description I am following DeLanda’s example. 
16
 Following Bonta and Protevi (2004, p. 17) this involves five steps: (1) Identify “important” aspects of a 
system’s behavior, which are called it “degrees of freedom”. (2) Construct a space with as many 
dimensions as the degrees of freedom of the system under consideration. (3) Represent each state of the 
system by a single point, with as many coordinates as there are dimensions. (4) Follow the movement of 
the point, which represents the changing states of the system as it produces a trajectory through state 
space, with time running as a parameter. (5) Attempt to solve the equations governing the trajectory and 
thereby predict the system’s behavior. Following Bonta and Protevi (2004, p.20): “attractors’ determine 
the patterns of behavior of the system, “bifurcators” are the thresholds where a system changes patterns 
and “symmetry-breaking events” are the transitions from one pattern to another. 
17
 The diagram has also been the focus of great attention in relation to the ongoing “crisis of 
representation” in architectural theory, as a technique which can operate with greater effectiveness than 
the perceived inadequacy of the deconstructivist approach, which Allen (2000) argues has been “to 
register the instability of the system through representation of instability” (p. 5). 
18
 “The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather 
constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980, p. 142). 
19
 See Mackenzie (2005b) for an extended discussion of the Lorenz attractor. 
20
 Simondon’s major works (L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, 1964; Du mode d’existence des 
objects techniques, 1969) have not been translated in English to date, except for the introduction The 
genesis of the individual (Simondon, 1992) 
21
 The “architect” being used here is only an ideal figure of hylomophism and refers to the link to the 
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